1 00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:25,200 IN FRENCH: 2 00:01:27,700 --> 00:01:30,300 REPORTER: The biggest spying scandal in cyber history. 3 00:01:30,300 --> 00:01:33,220 This investigation, which was actually done by Forbidden Stories, 4 00:01:33,220 --> 00:01:35,980 which is kind of an investigative group based in Paris, 5 00:01:35,980 --> 00:01:39,260 and shared with a number of different news outlets. 6 00:01:40,740 --> 00:01:42,820 FRENCH REPORTER: 7 00:01:47,900 --> 00:01:50,940 A joint investigation by 17 news outlets... 8 00:01:50,940 --> 00:01:52,980 SPANISH REPORTER: 9 00:01:56,300 --> 00:02:00,180 A massive data leak contained over 50,000 phone numbers. 10 00:02:00,180 --> 00:02:02,900 A leak of 50,000 phone numbers 11 00:02:02,900 --> 00:02:05,300 belonging to some big name politicians. 12 00:02:05,300 --> 00:02:07,300 IN MANDARIN: 13 00:02:10,340 --> 00:02:11,860 Pegasus. 14 00:02:11,860 --> 00:02:13,220 Pegasus. Pegasus. 15 00:02:13,220 --> 00:02:14,860 Pegasus spyware. 16 00:02:27,140 --> 00:02:29,660 Pegasus is like someone over your shoulder. 17 00:02:29,660 --> 00:02:32,060 It can read everything you're reading, 18 00:02:32,060 --> 00:02:33,980 it can watch everything you're watching. 19 00:02:33,980 --> 00:02:36,780 And once the spyware 20 00:02:36,780 --> 00:02:40,940 is taking the control of your device, basically you're trapped. 21 00:02:40,940 --> 00:02:43,860 REPORTER: This software has the potential to use the microphone 22 00:02:43,860 --> 00:02:47,940 and camera to listen to and even look at 23 00:02:47,940 --> 00:02:51,220 the owners of iPhone and Android devices. 24 00:03:13,540 --> 00:03:14,780 Hello, can you hear me? 25 00:03:14,780 --> 00:03:16,700 I can hear you. I don't see you. 26 00:03:16,700 --> 00:03:19,220 Hello. Hello, Paul. Hello? 27 00:03:19,220 --> 00:03:20,740 Hi, Donna. 28 00:03:20,740 --> 00:03:22,420 Hi, how are you? Hi, Donna. 29 00:03:22,420 --> 00:03:23,940 Good, and you? 30 00:03:23,940 --> 00:03:26,540 At that time, we quickly called the Washington Post, 31 00:03:26,540 --> 00:03:29,660 the Suddeutsche Zeitung, and all the partners to tell them 32 00:03:29,660 --> 00:03:32,020 that we were having access to a list. 33 00:03:32,020 --> 00:03:35,340 We wanted to tell you about some information we have 34 00:03:35,340 --> 00:03:37,580 and about a new project we are starting. 35 00:03:37,580 --> 00:03:41,100 There is a lot that concerns India. Ah. 36 00:03:41,100 --> 00:03:43,060 Some names in Mexico. 37 00:03:43,060 --> 00:03:44,820 Information about Hungary. 38 00:03:44,820 --> 00:03:46,340 Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 39 00:03:46,340 --> 00:03:49,620 What we needed at that moment was to put together 40 00:03:49,620 --> 00:03:52,380 the best possible team. We needed tech specialists. 41 00:03:52,380 --> 00:03:55,180 We needed people with good knowledge of the spyware, 42 00:03:55,180 --> 00:03:58,100 and journalists with contacts in the intelligence world. 43 00:03:58,100 --> 00:04:00,060 TANNOY: Elephant and Castle. Change here... 44 00:04:01,540 --> 00:04:05,420 Paul Lewis is the head of the investigative unit of the Guardian. 45 00:04:05,420 --> 00:04:08,340 The Guardian has been working for years on Pegasus. 46 00:04:12,500 --> 00:04:15,660 The moment they mentioned the numbers of phone numbers 47 00:04:15,660 --> 00:04:17,860 that they had, the quantity of phone numbers, 48 00:04:17,860 --> 00:04:20,060 tens of thousands, 49 00:04:20,060 --> 00:04:22,540 I mean, my jaw just hit the floor. 50 00:04:30,620 --> 00:04:36,500 Now, we had small pieces of the jigsaw of wrongdoing by NSO. 51 00:04:36,500 --> 00:04:39,300 Never before had anyone been able to stitch that together 52 00:04:39,300 --> 00:04:44,220 and tell the whole story, so if Forbidden Stories have got data 53 00:04:44,220 --> 00:04:48,460 that can identify not just who the customers of NSO are, 54 00:04:48,460 --> 00:04:50,780 but potentially point in the direction 55 00:04:50,780 --> 00:04:54,220 of who the targets are as well, this is a game-changer. 56 00:05:04,660 --> 00:05:07,940 Israel has become the world leader in this industry 57 00:05:07,940 --> 00:05:10,340 and exports these tools all over the world 58 00:05:10,340 --> 00:05:13,780 and, if you like, NSO Group was in many ways, 59 00:05:13,780 --> 00:05:16,260 you know, the jewel in the crown. 60 00:05:16,260 --> 00:05:20,900 Here was a company founded by three guys in 2010, 61 00:05:20,900 --> 00:05:25,100 a tech start-up become a unicorn that was incredibly successful, 62 00:05:25,100 --> 00:05:28,580 that claimed to have over 40 countries around the world 63 00:05:28,580 --> 00:05:30,180 buying its technology. 64 00:05:41,660 --> 00:05:45,340 We only sell it to government or to entities that we know 65 00:05:45,340 --> 00:05:48,260 or we want to believe that they will not misuse the tools. 66 00:05:48,260 --> 00:05:50,540 And this is how we check the customer, 67 00:05:50,540 --> 00:05:52,380 this is how we diligence them. 68 00:05:52,380 --> 00:05:54,300 We have all the mechanism to make sure 69 00:05:54,300 --> 00:05:56,740 that they are not misusing the systems. 70 00:05:58,980 --> 00:06:03,580 All of us suspected that if NSO Group was giving 71 00:06:03,580 --> 00:06:06,140 authoritarian and repressive regimes 72 00:06:06,140 --> 00:06:09,740 such a powerful instrument of surveillance - 73 00:06:09,740 --> 00:06:16,220 you know, you can get into the phone of anyone in the world 74 00:06:16,220 --> 00:06:19,740 and no-one's looking over your shoulder because NSO Group says, 75 00:06:19,740 --> 00:06:22,340 "You have to sign this piece of paper to agree 76 00:06:22,340 --> 00:06:24,580 "that this is just for criminal investigations 77 00:06:24,580 --> 00:06:26,420 "and terrorist investigations, 78 00:06:26,420 --> 00:06:30,420 "but we're not going to check how you use this technology." 79 00:06:30,420 --> 00:06:32,460 So you have a carte blanche. 80 00:06:38,700 --> 00:06:42,380 We had a kaleidoscope of potential victims. 81 00:06:42,380 --> 00:06:45,340 But how do we prove that Pegasus was on the phones? 82 00:07:23,260 --> 00:07:26,260 It's a piece of code that looks very similar to all the others 83 00:07:26,260 --> 00:07:28,420 that you are running on your phone. 84 00:07:28,420 --> 00:07:32,620 It's just designed to do something that it shouldn't. 85 00:07:32,620 --> 00:07:36,900 An investigation on a spyware like this begins with a first case, 86 00:07:36,900 --> 00:07:40,340 begins with a patient zero, so to speak, 87 00:07:40,340 --> 00:07:42,540 and that opens up everything. 88 00:07:45,580 --> 00:07:48,380 The very first cases, they left their infrastructure 89 00:07:48,380 --> 00:07:52,420 that was connected to NSO.Group.com - 90 00:07:52,420 --> 00:07:54,100 that was the first mistake. 91 00:07:54,100 --> 00:07:56,700 And then from there you start saying, 92 00:07:56,700 --> 00:07:59,580 "OK, I've seen this infrastructure. 93 00:07:59,580 --> 00:08:02,740 "It's connected to the company, quite evidently." 94 00:08:05,460 --> 00:08:08,540 These technologies just evolve continuously, 95 00:08:08,540 --> 00:08:11,580 so it's a cat and mouse game by nature, meaning that, 96 00:08:11,580 --> 00:08:15,900 but the unfortunate reality is that against capabilities like those 97 00:08:15,900 --> 00:08:20,020 that Pegasus customers have, there's not much you can do 98 00:08:20,020 --> 00:08:25,420 from a digital security perspective. You can't really stop them. 99 00:08:28,620 --> 00:08:31,380 One of the very first things that we did after getting access 100 00:08:31,380 --> 00:08:35,420 to the list was to cross-check the list with our own contact list, 101 00:08:35,420 --> 00:08:38,460 and I did that with my personal contact list. 102 00:08:38,460 --> 00:08:41,100 Immediately a phone number popping up. 103 00:08:41,100 --> 00:08:43,100 That was the phone number of a friend of mine, 104 00:08:43,100 --> 00:08:45,500 someone I know well for years. 105 00:08:45,500 --> 00:08:49,100 She's a journalist in Azerbaijan and her name is Khadija Ismayilova. 106 00:08:51,500 --> 00:08:54,020 REPORTER: Her name is Khadija Ismayilova. 107 00:08:54,020 --> 00:08:56,260 She's an award-winning investigative reporter 108 00:08:56,260 --> 00:08:58,380 and an outspoken critic of the government, 109 00:08:58,380 --> 00:09:01,140 renowned for her exposes of corruption at the hands 110 00:09:01,140 --> 00:09:03,100 of the country's president. 111 00:09:04,180 --> 00:09:08,980 Khadija Ismayilova relentlessly kept on exposing the wrongdoing 112 00:09:08,980 --> 00:09:11,820 and the corruption of the Aliyev regime. 113 00:09:18,780 --> 00:09:23,300 The regime of Azerbaijan is basically controlling everything, 114 00:09:23,300 --> 00:09:26,420 censoring everything. Human rights activists, press freedom, 115 00:09:26,420 --> 00:09:29,100 everything is under the control of that ruling party. 116 00:09:29,100 --> 00:09:33,740 And as soon as you start criticising them, you will end up in jail. 117 00:09:33,740 --> 00:09:38,140 She showed how they were having their hands 118 00:09:38,140 --> 00:09:41,940 into a big chunk of the Azerbaijani economy. 119 00:09:41,940 --> 00:09:46,260 She was showing how they were taking money in a covert way, 120 00:09:46,260 --> 00:09:49,540 how they were stealing money, basically, from the people. 121 00:09:49,540 --> 00:09:51,580 IN AZERBAIJANI: 122 00:09:55,780 --> 00:09:57,780 SHOUTING 123 00:10:01,060 --> 00:10:03,420 MAN SHOUTS: Journalist! Journalist! 124 00:10:08,700 --> 00:10:11,700 After all this investigative reporting, 125 00:10:11,700 --> 00:10:15,980 Khadija became a prime target for the government in Baku 126 00:10:15,980 --> 00:10:17,380 and for the Aliyevs. 127 00:10:17,380 --> 00:10:20,580 In Azerbaijan, there is a culture of blackmailing people, 128 00:10:20,580 --> 00:10:22,260 blackmailing political opponents, 129 00:10:22,260 --> 00:10:24,460 blackmailing human rights activists and journalists. 130 00:10:24,460 --> 00:10:26,620 They can take your personal pictures, 131 00:10:26,620 --> 00:10:29,180 your personal video to blackmail you, 132 00:10:29,180 --> 00:10:34,460 and in 2012, Khadija Ismayilova really paid the price for that. 133 00:10:34,460 --> 00:10:37,860 I remember the day when Khadija called me and said, 134 00:10:37,860 --> 00:10:40,740 "Paul, something terrible happened. 135 00:10:40,740 --> 00:10:45,420 "I received this envelope with photos 136 00:10:45,420 --> 00:10:48,060 "that are taken in my bedroom illegally. 137 00:10:48,060 --> 00:10:50,100 "They probably had a hidden camera. 138 00:10:50,100 --> 00:10:53,620 "And they're blackmailing me with these photos." 139 00:10:53,620 --> 00:10:57,980 Right next to the picture, there was a small message saying to Khadija, 140 00:10:57,980 --> 00:10:59,740 "You should stop your investigation, 141 00:10:59,740 --> 00:11:01,940 "otherwise we will publish those videos." 142 00:11:01,940 --> 00:11:04,580 But Khadija refused that deal 143 00:11:04,580 --> 00:11:08,220 and she decided to continue her investigation. 144 00:11:08,220 --> 00:11:10,220 CLAMOURING 145 00:11:13,140 --> 00:11:15,860 REPORTER: She was sentenced to seven-and-a-half years in prison 146 00:11:15,860 --> 00:11:17,900 for embezzlement and tax evasion, 147 00:11:17,900 --> 00:11:21,380 but her supporters say the trial was politically motivated 148 00:11:21,380 --> 00:11:25,620 and accused the president of cracking down on press freedoms. 149 00:11:35,180 --> 00:11:38,740 I don't know how to proceed with Khadija 150 00:11:38,740 --> 00:11:41,180 because I don't want to put Khadija in danger. 151 00:11:41,180 --> 00:11:44,180 But we wanted to... 152 00:11:44,180 --> 00:11:47,460 ..to do some forensic of her device. 153 00:11:47,460 --> 00:11:52,580 The thing that is quite difficult is how to get in touch with Khadija 154 00:11:52,580 --> 00:11:56,140 without communicating on electronic device. 155 00:11:56,140 --> 00:11:59,220 According to what we see, we see that Khadija is really 156 00:11:59,220 --> 00:12:04,500 one of the top persons of interest for Azeri intelligence services, 157 00:12:04,500 --> 00:12:06,700 which is not a surprise, of course. 158 00:12:06,700 --> 00:12:09,140 This is very sensitive, right? Yeah. 159 00:12:09,140 --> 00:12:11,260 This is very, very sensitive, especially for her, 160 00:12:11,260 --> 00:12:13,140 because she's basically on probation. 161 00:12:13,140 --> 00:12:15,180 So that's going to be a risk anyway. 162 00:12:18,460 --> 00:12:22,220 One day we learned that Khadija was about to travel to Turkey 163 00:12:22,220 --> 00:12:25,540 for medical reasons. So clearly, first, that was a kind of opening. 164 00:12:25,540 --> 00:12:28,660 So what we did after that is that we decided to send one team 165 00:12:28,660 --> 00:12:32,060 over there first to tell Khadija that we were having reasons 166 00:12:32,060 --> 00:12:34,660 to believe that she was surveilled, 167 00:12:34,660 --> 00:12:38,300 but as well that we found a phone number in the list. 168 00:12:48,940 --> 00:12:50,500 Now I'm nervous. 169 00:12:50,500 --> 00:12:53,740 LAUGHTER 170 00:12:53,740 --> 00:12:55,340 I cannot stand still. 171 00:12:57,580 --> 00:13:01,020 Khadija! Khadija! 172 00:13:01,020 --> 00:13:03,980 How are you doing? 173 00:13:03,980 --> 00:13:06,420 INDISTINCT CONVERSATION 174 00:13:16,580 --> 00:13:19,060 Can we open the window? 175 00:13:19,060 --> 00:13:21,460 We can take this off, right? 176 00:13:21,460 --> 00:13:25,540 That's too long. 177 00:13:30,820 --> 00:13:34,420 So, basically, what we have is list of 178 00:13:35,540 --> 00:13:40,220 the phone numbers that were targeted in Azerbaijan. 179 00:13:40,220 --> 00:13:42,340 That's so cool. 180 00:13:42,340 --> 00:13:48,220 And...yeah, so we have about 1,000 numbers from Azerbaijan. 181 00:13:48,220 --> 00:13:49,940 And you're among them. 182 00:13:49,940 --> 00:13:52,980 Oh! And then we also have 183 00:13:52,980 --> 00:13:57,060 some people who are your friends and your lawyers. 184 00:13:57,060 --> 00:13:58,780 Mm-hm, OK. 185 00:13:58,780 --> 00:14:01,500 And what does that program do? 186 00:14:01,500 --> 00:14:04,260 So what the program does is, 187 00:14:04,260 --> 00:14:06,700 it basically, without you knowing, 188 00:14:06,700 --> 00:14:10,460 it installs things on your phone. 189 00:14:11,860 --> 00:14:13,340 And then it allows... 190 00:14:14,940 --> 00:14:17,500 Even if I didn't click on anything? 191 00:14:17,500 --> 00:14:20,900 Yeah, so the secrecy of this, it's called Pegasus, 192 00:14:20,900 --> 00:14:24,260 and the secrecy of it is that you don't actually see 193 00:14:24,260 --> 00:14:26,140 or you don't do anything. 194 00:14:26,140 --> 00:14:28,900 So before you had this, you had to click on something 195 00:14:28,900 --> 00:14:30,340 to be infected. Yeah. 196 00:14:30,340 --> 00:14:33,660 In this case, it all happens in the background and you have no 197 00:14:33,660 --> 00:14:36,020 idea that you're infected. 198 00:14:36,020 --> 00:14:39,900 And when you're infected, it's transmitting your messages, 199 00:14:39,900 --> 00:14:43,820 your images, everything that's happened on your phone, 200 00:14:43,820 --> 00:14:47,380 including the signal, because they have the phone itself. 201 00:14:47,380 --> 00:14:49,460 And it's legal to sell it? Yes. 202 00:14:49,460 --> 00:14:54,340 So what we know is that most likely 203 00:14:54,340 --> 00:14:57,060 some time in 2018, the government got it. 204 00:14:57,060 --> 00:15:02,380 OK. And we have a lot of data from 2019. 205 00:15:02,380 --> 00:15:04,860 And, you know, that was a big year of protest, 206 00:15:04,860 --> 00:15:07,940 you were on a hunger strike with other people. Yeah. 207 00:15:07,940 --> 00:15:09,460 You guys had a woman march, 208 00:15:09,460 --> 00:15:11,820 you were leading the march. Yeah. 209 00:15:11,820 --> 00:15:13,500 Shoo... 210 00:15:13,500 --> 00:15:15,940 SHE LAUGHS 211 00:15:15,940 --> 00:15:19,180 It's kind of the most like you in the country. 212 00:15:19,180 --> 00:15:23,300 Well, why they are so idle, I mean, that's... 213 00:15:27,940 --> 00:15:29,020 Oh. 214 00:15:31,980 --> 00:15:33,020 Mm. 215 00:15:36,900 --> 00:15:42,780 So one way for us to verify that what exactly was done 216 00:15:42,780 --> 00:15:47,020 in your case would be to do forensic on your phone. 217 00:15:47,020 --> 00:15:53,340 So the question is whether you would allow us to make a backup 218 00:15:53,340 --> 00:15:59,380 of your phone and basically check it for the traces of Pegasus. 219 00:16:00,940 --> 00:16:02,940 Yeah, yeah. 220 00:16:04,660 --> 00:16:09,660 Is there any way to avoid this surveillance? 221 00:16:09,660 --> 00:16:12,500 Yes, we will set you up with a new device 222 00:16:12,500 --> 00:16:15,580 that you will be able to use... On a phone. 223 00:16:15,580 --> 00:16:17,980 Is there a balcony? 224 00:16:17,980 --> 00:16:22,660 There must be some way to do it. 225 00:16:23,740 --> 00:16:26,820 There are other ways to communicate... Yeah. 226 00:16:26,820 --> 00:16:27,940 ..securely. 227 00:16:35,140 --> 00:16:36,220 It's like... 228 00:16:37,780 --> 00:16:41,180 ..it makes you to want to live in the... 229 00:16:42,140 --> 00:16:43,940 ..bubble. 230 00:16:43,940 --> 00:16:45,020 But then... 231 00:16:46,100 --> 00:16:50,700 ..like, so no-one can enter, like, in some sort of... 232 00:17:23,700 --> 00:17:25,020 This is her phone. 233 00:17:26,420 --> 00:17:28,260 You don't need any cables? 234 00:17:28,260 --> 00:17:29,340 No. OK. 235 00:17:33,060 --> 00:17:36,500 Do you know if she still has a backup? 236 00:17:36,500 --> 00:17:38,260 Yes, she does. Yes, she does. OK. 237 00:17:39,340 --> 00:17:42,180 Well, right now, I'm trying to jailbreak the phone. 238 00:17:42,180 --> 00:17:45,020 PHONE BEEPS 239 00:17:45,020 --> 00:17:48,060 Hopefully it works. 240 00:17:55,100 --> 00:17:56,380 So right now, I am... 241 00:18:00,980 --> 00:18:03,140 ..navigating through the phone. 242 00:18:06,980 --> 00:18:11,100 I'm looking for things that might have executed network activity 243 00:18:11,100 --> 00:18:14,180 that is connectable to the company, 244 00:18:14,180 --> 00:18:18,540 any leftovers of malicious executions, 245 00:18:18,540 --> 00:18:21,540 accounts that we know of. 246 00:18:21,540 --> 00:18:25,860 Anything essentially that tells me the history of this phone. 247 00:18:32,700 --> 00:18:36,780 That's interesting. That's not something I've seen before. 248 00:18:41,940 --> 00:18:47,980 We see processes that we know are connected to Pegasus. 249 00:18:47,980 --> 00:18:53,620 We'll see some message accounts that are connected to the attacks, 250 00:18:53,620 --> 00:18:57,300 because this might indicate what was the entry point. 251 00:18:57,300 --> 00:18:59,540 Oh, it was Apple Music? What the fuck? 252 00:18:59,540 --> 00:19:01,860 Oh, really? 253 00:19:01,860 --> 00:19:03,420 That's weird. 254 00:19:04,780 --> 00:19:08,980 So they might have started using Apple Music to exploit it. 255 00:19:11,380 --> 00:19:13,900 Erm... 256 00:19:13,900 --> 00:19:16,660 ..I have to do some more digging on this, as I need to look at 257 00:19:16,660 --> 00:19:19,540 what specifically these applications are. 258 00:19:23,180 --> 00:19:26,420 It's definitely among the ones most targeted. 259 00:19:39,540 --> 00:19:42,620 No, Khadija's coming! 260 00:19:42,620 --> 00:19:44,820 Hi, Claudio. 261 00:19:44,820 --> 00:19:46,180 Hi. 262 00:19:47,700 --> 00:19:50,780 So now tell me how bad it is. 263 00:19:50,780 --> 00:19:52,820 OK. 264 00:19:52,820 --> 00:19:57,740 There are definitely some records 265 00:19:57,740 --> 00:20:00,620 that indicate various points 266 00:20:00,620 --> 00:20:04,180 where the phone seemed to have been compromised. 267 00:20:04,180 --> 00:20:05,820 Mm-hm. 268 00:20:05,820 --> 00:20:09,260 So I started feeling like I played doctor in the 1300s, 269 00:20:09,260 --> 00:20:13,580 you know, like, I'm basically kind of just keeping the death count... 270 00:20:13,580 --> 00:20:15,260 March of 2019... 271 00:20:15,260 --> 00:20:17,700 ..I'm contributing to creating a trauma here 272 00:20:17,700 --> 00:20:20,260 and I can see it in many cases. 273 00:20:20,260 --> 00:20:23,220 Like, I can see it that they are... Right now, 274 00:20:23,220 --> 00:20:25,140 they're going to a dramatic moment. 275 00:20:25,140 --> 00:20:29,260 And I'm like that person in the room that is breaking it. 276 00:20:31,140 --> 00:20:36,460 There are also some more recent records from even as recent as early 277 00:20:36,460 --> 00:20:39,780 May of this year, so until a couple of weeks ago. 278 00:20:39,780 --> 00:20:43,300 But all in all, it seems like this probably extended 279 00:20:43,300 --> 00:20:46,060 between 2019 and 2020. 280 00:20:46,060 --> 00:20:47,940 2020, at the very least. 281 00:20:47,940 --> 00:20:51,100 I've been told that you will not know 282 00:20:51,100 --> 00:20:55,620 what exactly had been monitored or recorded. 283 00:20:55,620 --> 00:21:00,260 With these kinds of monitoring technology, 284 00:21:00,260 --> 00:21:04,020 the point where they have that level of access to the device, 285 00:21:04,020 --> 00:21:06,500 virtually everything is possible, so... 286 00:21:10,580 --> 00:21:13,780 Yeah, thank you. Have a good day, bye-bye. 287 00:21:13,780 --> 00:21:15,740 Bye. Bye. 288 00:21:16,900 --> 00:21:18,580 That's not great news. No. 289 00:21:30,420 --> 00:21:35,300 All night I've been thinking about, what did I do with my phone? 290 00:21:35,300 --> 00:21:37,460 And I feel guilty. 291 00:21:37,460 --> 00:21:40,500 I feel guilty, too, for the messages I've sent. 292 00:21:40,500 --> 00:21:46,940 I feel guilty for the information sources who send me... 293 00:21:46,940 --> 00:21:52,860 ..thinking that some encrypted messaging ways are secure. 294 00:21:52,860 --> 00:21:57,260 They did it and they didn't know that my phone was infected. 295 00:21:57,260 --> 00:22:02,860 I mean, my family members are also victimised. 296 00:22:02,860 --> 00:22:06,900 The sources are victimised. 297 00:22:06,900 --> 00:22:11,180 Everyone. I mean, people I've been working with. 298 00:22:11,180 --> 00:22:14,700 People who told me they had private secrets. 299 00:22:14,700 --> 00:22:16,220 I victimised everyone. 300 00:22:16,220 --> 00:22:18,740 I mean, it's not just me, I... 301 00:22:18,740 --> 00:22:21,620 ..I put so many people in danger. 302 00:22:22,940 --> 00:22:24,220 And... 303 00:22:26,380 --> 00:22:29,420 ..and I'm angry. 304 00:22:29,420 --> 00:22:32,100 Again, I'm angry, I'm angry with the government, 305 00:22:32,100 --> 00:22:36,620 I'm angry with the companies that produce all these tools 306 00:22:36,620 --> 00:22:38,900 and sell it to the bad guys... 307 00:22:38,900 --> 00:22:42,220 ..like Aliyev regime. 308 00:22:42,220 --> 00:22:43,820 It's... 309 00:22:45,700 --> 00:22:48,780 It's really... It's despicable, 310 00:22:48,780 --> 00:22:51,300 it's heinous, I don't know... 311 00:24:36,060 --> 00:24:40,900 Israel has the advantage of not only developing new technologies 312 00:24:40,900 --> 00:24:43,460 and weaponry, but testing it live. 313 00:24:43,460 --> 00:24:48,460 And this is something Israel knows it can use to sell outside. 314 00:24:55,300 --> 00:24:58,340 When you want to control a huge population, 315 00:24:58,340 --> 00:25:00,580 like we do with Palestinians, 316 00:25:00,580 --> 00:25:04,300 you have to have assets everywhere, 317 00:25:04,300 --> 00:25:07,020 so everyone can be a target, 318 00:25:07,020 --> 00:25:10,300 because we don't want only the - I don't know - 319 00:25:10,300 --> 00:25:16,100 terrorists from the Hamas, but also maybe his neighbour or his cousin 320 00:25:16,100 --> 00:25:20,540 or the person who sells milk in the corner of the street. 321 00:25:22,300 --> 00:25:25,820 If you want to recruit human agents, 322 00:25:25,820 --> 00:25:29,700 you need to collect their weaknesses, 323 00:25:29,700 --> 00:25:32,860 things that you can use to blackmail. 324 00:25:32,860 --> 00:25:38,820 And so part of what 8200 does is to collect this blackmail 325 00:25:38,820 --> 00:25:41,420 potential information about everybody. 326 00:25:43,660 --> 00:25:47,900 If you're gay or if you have medical...special medical condition 327 00:25:47,900 --> 00:25:50,580 or you have financial problems 328 00:25:50,580 --> 00:25:53,660 or someone from your family has one of those, 329 00:25:53,660 --> 00:25:57,900 then that's something we can use against you to blackmail you 330 00:25:57,900 --> 00:25:59,740 and get you to cooperate. 331 00:26:13,140 --> 00:26:17,500 It's this kind of approach that you see again in other countries 332 00:26:17,500 --> 00:26:20,580 used by the clients of NSO. 333 00:26:28,900 --> 00:26:32,100 One of the very first things that we have been able to see 334 00:26:32,100 --> 00:26:35,420 reading the list was the very high number of phone numbers 335 00:26:35,420 --> 00:26:36,940 coming from Mexico. 336 00:26:36,940 --> 00:26:39,540 But actually that was not so surprising, 337 00:26:39,540 --> 00:26:40,980 because we knew for years 338 00:26:40,980 --> 00:26:42,220 that Mexico was one of 339 00:26:42,220 --> 00:26:43,700 the very first customers 340 00:26:43,700 --> 00:26:44,900 of the NSO Group. 341 00:26:47,180 --> 00:26:50,020 And we know as well since 2017 342 00:26:50,020 --> 00:26:53,620 that 19 people from the civil society in Mexico 343 00:26:53,620 --> 00:26:58,620 were targeted by Pegasus, including one very famous journalist 344 00:26:58,620 --> 00:27:02,820 called Carmen Aristegui, a journalist who does work for CNN, 345 00:27:02,820 --> 00:27:05,620 who is extremely popular in the country. 346 00:29:59,700 --> 00:30:02,580 PHONE RINGS 347 00:30:10,100 --> 00:30:13,540 Carmen Aristegui was already a known victim of the spyware. 348 00:30:13,540 --> 00:30:15,420 So we asked her to join us to investigate 349 00:30:15,420 --> 00:30:18,180 the Mexican part of the Pegasus Project, 350 00:30:18,180 --> 00:30:21,620 and what we first asked her was to help us to identify 351 00:30:21,620 --> 00:30:25,420 the thousands of Mexican numbers appearing on the list. 352 00:37:53,460 --> 00:37:55,140 Right... 353 00:37:55,140 --> 00:37:59,220 There's a lot of evidence to suggest that NSO Group 354 00:37:59,220 --> 00:38:03,540 had the direct backing and support of Bibi Netanyahu's government. 355 00:38:07,860 --> 00:38:10,700 In order to sell its product to governments around the world, 356 00:38:10,700 --> 00:38:12,380 it required permits, 357 00:38:12,380 --> 00:38:16,500 effectively licences from the Israeli Defence Ministry. 358 00:38:16,500 --> 00:38:18,980 I decided several years ago to turn Israel 359 00:38:18,980 --> 00:38:22,940 into one of the five cyber powers of the world. 360 00:38:24,620 --> 00:38:26,460 In order for the companies to develop, 361 00:38:26,460 --> 00:38:27,660 they need to make... 362 00:38:27,660 --> 00:38:29,060 What do they need to make? 363 00:38:30,060 --> 00:38:31,340 Money! 364 00:38:33,220 --> 00:38:35,380 They need to make money. 365 00:38:35,380 --> 00:38:39,060 Now, the easiest way to make sure that they don't make money is, 366 00:38:39,060 --> 00:38:41,020 one, high taxes, right? 367 00:38:42,220 --> 00:38:43,540 What's the other one? 368 00:38:44,740 --> 00:38:46,020 Regulations. 369 00:38:47,100 --> 00:38:49,980 Have you ever heard of regulations? 370 00:38:49,980 --> 00:38:53,140 We have a problem with regulations. 371 00:38:53,140 --> 00:38:56,620 So the policy we have is keep taxes low 372 00:38:56,620 --> 00:38:58,860 and keep regulations low. 373 00:38:58,860 --> 00:39:01,020 Minimise regulations. 374 00:39:01,020 --> 00:39:03,740 There is no industry more susceptible 375 00:39:03,740 --> 00:39:06,980 and more inviting of regulations than cybersecurity. 376 00:39:06,980 --> 00:39:08,260 It's like weapons. 377 00:39:08,260 --> 00:39:09,540 It is a weapon! 378 00:39:24,700 --> 00:39:28,180 Around us is a sea of dictators and autocrats 379 00:39:28,180 --> 00:39:29,620 and kings and sultans. 380 00:39:30,740 --> 00:39:32,980 This is the neighbourhood we have. We didn't choose it. 381 00:39:34,460 --> 00:39:36,700 But at the end of the day, Iran is the biggest threat 382 00:39:36,700 --> 00:39:38,340 on Arabs and Israelis. 383 00:39:43,260 --> 00:39:46,420 Netanyahu wanted to forge a camp, 384 00:39:46,420 --> 00:39:49,580 a united front against Iran, 385 00:39:49,580 --> 00:39:52,460 and he would use many, many tools in order to do that. 386 00:39:52,460 --> 00:39:55,020 One of the tools is giving Israeli technology. 387 00:39:56,700 --> 00:39:59,860 NSO has a very attractive tool. 388 00:40:05,860 --> 00:40:07,660 AMITAI SIGHS 389 00:40:07,660 --> 00:40:10,460 # Do-do, do-do-do-do-do-do. # 390 00:41:17,420 --> 00:41:21,340 Jamal Khashoggi's murder, really, 391 00:41:21,340 --> 00:41:24,740 in the history of the Post, 392 00:41:24,740 --> 00:41:26,340 stands out. 393 00:41:27,900 --> 00:41:31,620 Jamal Khashoggi was an opinion writer for the Washington Post. 394 00:41:31,620 --> 00:41:34,980 Very gentle, soft-spoken man, 395 00:41:34,980 --> 00:41:37,620 willing to share his opinions. 396 00:41:37,620 --> 00:41:39,980 His voice became very important 397 00:41:39,980 --> 00:41:43,980 because he was the single most important dissident 398 00:41:43,980 --> 00:41:46,020 writing about the Saudi regime. 399 00:41:47,620 --> 00:41:48,940 Jamal, let me start with you. 400 00:41:48,940 --> 00:41:51,340 You've compared your Crown Prince to Putin, 401 00:41:51,340 --> 00:41:52,740 to Iran's supreme leader. 402 00:41:52,740 --> 00:41:54,300 You've said he's creating, quote, 403 00:41:54,300 --> 00:41:56,180 "an interesting form of dictatorship". 404 00:41:56,180 --> 00:41:57,460 How so? 405 00:41:57,460 --> 00:41:59,180 I still see him as a reformer, 406 00:41:59,180 --> 00:42:01,860 but he is gathering all power within his hand. 407 00:42:05,580 --> 00:42:08,740 As we speak today, there are Saudi intellectuals 408 00:42:08,740 --> 00:42:09,980 and journalists jailed. 409 00:42:11,420 --> 00:42:13,620 His murder was so cold-blooded. 410 00:42:16,780 --> 00:42:21,180 Jamal Khashoggi went to the consulate in Istanbul 411 00:42:21,180 --> 00:42:23,060 and then he disappeared. 412 00:42:24,780 --> 00:42:27,180 His close friends and family are still trying to figure out 413 00:42:27,180 --> 00:42:28,420 what the situation is. 414 00:42:28,420 --> 00:42:30,220 They're waiting on an official statement. 415 00:42:30,220 --> 00:42:31,940 I spoke to his fiancee, who was also here 416 00:42:31,940 --> 00:42:34,620 and told us that they came here to issue a number of documents 417 00:42:34,620 --> 00:42:36,020 so they could marry. 418 00:42:36,020 --> 00:42:38,100 Turkish officials believe he was killed by agents 419 00:42:38,100 --> 00:42:40,260 of his own government inside the consulate. 420 00:42:42,340 --> 00:42:46,020 They dispatched an assassination team 421 00:42:46,020 --> 00:42:49,300 that landed in a plane in the airport 422 00:42:49,300 --> 00:42:56,300 and came in cars with tools to hack him up, 423 00:42:56,300 --> 00:42:58,340 hack his bones, 424 00:42:58,340 --> 00:43:02,220 and carry him out in a suitcase, or suitcases. 425 00:43:02,220 --> 00:43:03,500 Uh! 426 00:43:07,220 --> 00:43:11,020 The word is that you sold Pegasus to them, 427 00:43:11,020 --> 00:43:14,980 and then they turned it around to get Khashoggi. 428 00:43:14,980 --> 00:43:17,980 Khashoggi murder is horrible - really horrible. 429 00:43:17,980 --> 00:43:24,260 And therefore, when I first heard their accusations 430 00:43:24,260 --> 00:43:28,060 that our technology been used on Jamal Khashoggi, 431 00:43:28,060 --> 00:43:33,180 or on his relatives, I started an immediate check about it. 432 00:43:33,180 --> 00:43:36,020 And I can tell you very clear. 433 00:43:36,020 --> 00:43:40,460 We had nothing to do with this horrible murder. 434 00:43:43,820 --> 00:43:48,060 When Forbidden Stories first contacted me, 435 00:43:48,060 --> 00:43:50,820 the minute we found out about this list, 436 00:43:50,820 --> 00:43:54,860 the first thing we all did was to check for any numbers 437 00:43:54,860 --> 00:43:57,020 related to Jamal Khashoggi. 438 00:43:58,420 --> 00:44:04,860 And right away, we found two numbers associated with the two women 439 00:44:04,860 --> 00:44:06,460 closest to him in his life. 440 00:44:19,860 --> 00:44:22,020 His fiancee Hatice, 441 00:44:22,020 --> 00:44:25,220 who we'd all gotten to know on television, 442 00:44:25,220 --> 00:44:26,780 because she was outside the consulate 443 00:44:26,780 --> 00:44:28,820 when he didn't reappear. 444 00:44:28,820 --> 00:44:33,020 I'm hoping that they will let us do forensics on her phone 445 00:44:33,020 --> 00:44:36,900 to see for certain whether she was targeted. 446 00:44:36,900 --> 00:44:38,340 And maybe, if we get lucky, 447 00:44:38,340 --> 00:44:40,460 whether we can see what they took out of her phone. 448 00:44:52,980 --> 00:44:54,740 They killed my future. 449 00:44:54,740 --> 00:44:56,500 They killed my life. 450 00:44:57,780 --> 00:45:00,820 I lost everything - just the one day. 451 00:45:00,820 --> 00:45:05,020 I felt inside me something changed and broke, you know? 452 00:45:06,300 --> 00:45:09,740 I remember the first days after the murder. 453 00:45:10,780 --> 00:45:16,300 A lot of times, they try to hack my email. 454 00:45:16,300 --> 00:45:17,580 Hmm. 455 00:45:17,580 --> 00:45:22,860 Do you feel like your phone is doing anything strange? 456 00:45:22,860 --> 00:45:24,700 Do you think it could be hacked? 457 00:45:24,700 --> 00:45:26,140 We can test it. 458 00:45:26,140 --> 00:45:28,820 So we could do that if you wanted to do it. 459 00:45:28,820 --> 00:45:31,060 We... OK, you can do that. 460 00:45:31,060 --> 00:45:32,700 OK, that'd be great. 461 00:45:32,700 --> 00:45:35,740 Well, we just need to plug your phone into our computer. 462 00:45:35,740 --> 00:45:37,860 OK. So maybe we do that. 463 00:45:37,860 --> 00:45:39,140 Great. 464 00:45:50,260 --> 00:45:51,980 Hello? 465 00:45:51,980 --> 00:45:53,620 Claudio? 466 00:45:53,620 --> 00:45:54,980 Hi. 467 00:45:54,980 --> 00:45:56,980 It's Dana. 468 00:45:56,980 --> 00:45:58,980 Hi, how are you? 469 00:45:58,980 --> 00:46:00,980 I don't know. You tell me. 470 00:46:00,980 --> 00:46:05,180 So I checked both the uploads. 471 00:46:05,180 --> 00:46:06,380 Er... 472 00:46:06,380 --> 00:46:09,020 The new one seems clean to me. 473 00:46:10,820 --> 00:46:13,420 The old one, however, has some traces 474 00:46:13,420 --> 00:46:16,500 on 6th October 2018. 475 00:46:16,500 --> 00:46:20,100 Seems to have been a first compromise, 476 00:46:20,100 --> 00:46:22,980 which was followed by some additional traces 477 00:46:22,980 --> 00:46:25,300 on the 9th and then on the 12th. 478 00:46:25,300 --> 00:46:29,420 There's also an additional record in June of 2019, 479 00:46:29,420 --> 00:46:33,300 but that seems to be probably a failed attempt. 480 00:46:33,300 --> 00:46:35,900 And I don't see anything following that. 481 00:46:35,900 --> 00:46:37,260 OK. 482 00:46:41,100 --> 00:46:42,660 And then we find out the date, 483 00:46:42,660 --> 00:46:45,780 which is four days after his murder... 484 00:46:47,100 --> 00:46:49,260 ..when she's still outside the embassy, 485 00:46:49,260 --> 00:46:52,580 trying to figure out what's happening. 486 00:46:52,580 --> 00:46:55,340 And it just seemed like such a ballsy move 487 00:46:55,340 --> 00:46:57,460 on the Saudis' part, 488 00:46:57,460 --> 00:47:01,980 to surveil the person who has become the public face 489 00:47:01,980 --> 00:47:04,020 of his disappearance. 490 00:47:14,020 --> 00:47:18,020 We learnt that Jamal had a complicated personal life. 491 00:47:18,020 --> 00:47:20,220 The other phone number that we discovered 492 00:47:20,220 --> 00:47:24,460 was a woman named Hanan El-Atr. 493 00:47:25,620 --> 00:47:29,700 Hanan Atr is probably the least-known character 494 00:47:29,700 --> 00:47:32,700 in Jamal Khashoggi's life. 495 00:47:32,700 --> 00:47:34,740 She's actually his wife, 496 00:47:34,740 --> 00:47:36,860 and most people have not heard of her. 497 00:47:38,540 --> 00:47:42,460 He actually had secretly married in the United States 498 00:47:42,460 --> 00:47:44,260 in an Islamic ceremony. 499 00:47:45,940 --> 00:47:49,260 It took me a long time to find Hanan. 500 00:47:49,260 --> 00:47:53,580 And what I discovered is Hanan is living in hiding 501 00:47:53,580 --> 00:47:58,500 in the United States while she waits for her political asylum case. 502 00:48:02,180 --> 00:48:05,340 She was a flight attendant for Emirates Airlines. 503 00:48:05,340 --> 00:48:06,900 And so she flew all over the world 504 00:48:06,900 --> 00:48:09,860 and she was communicating with him on foreign phones. 505 00:48:15,300 --> 00:48:18,180 He was so happy, and they were so happy as well. 506 00:48:22,140 --> 00:48:25,420 This is on his birthday in a restaurant in Washington, 507 00:48:25,420 --> 00:48:27,940 and his friend Maggie behind us - 508 00:48:27,940 --> 00:48:30,420 she made the birthday party. 509 00:48:30,420 --> 00:48:35,100 There's all of his friends around us. 510 00:48:35,100 --> 00:48:37,980 This last birthday in his life. 511 00:48:37,980 --> 00:48:42,220 He was careful, but he didn't realise maybe, my device, 512 00:48:42,220 --> 00:48:43,700 it is much dangerous. 513 00:48:43,700 --> 00:48:45,180 And I didn't know as well. 514 00:48:45,180 --> 00:48:48,740 He suspect but he's not sure - and I am not sure as well. 515 00:48:52,380 --> 00:48:56,300 She allowed me to download her phone... 516 00:48:57,620 --> 00:49:01,300 ..to send a copy to Bill Marczak at Citizen Lab, 517 00:49:01,300 --> 00:49:05,340 who also conducts forensic analysis of phones. 518 00:49:09,060 --> 00:49:13,260 So we've set up a meeting with Hanan and her lawyer, Randa Fahmy, 519 00:49:13,260 --> 00:49:16,860 and Bill's going to Zoom in from California, where he's working. 520 00:49:21,300 --> 00:49:23,580 What I did is I analysed, 521 00:49:23,580 --> 00:49:27,580 erm, all the available data on two Android phones 522 00:49:27,580 --> 00:49:30,740 and one laptop belonging to Hanan. 523 00:49:30,740 --> 00:49:32,660 On one of the phones, 524 00:49:32,660 --> 00:49:37,420 it appears that there were two separate links 525 00:49:37,420 --> 00:49:40,380 to the Pegasus spyware that were actually opened. 526 00:49:40,380 --> 00:49:42,300 There are a number... 527 00:49:42,300 --> 00:49:45,180 In fact, there are seven text messages 528 00:49:45,180 --> 00:49:50,900 from a period of November 8th to November 26th 2017. 529 00:49:50,900 --> 00:49:53,820 We have the smoking gun from Hanan's phone. 530 00:49:53,820 --> 00:49:57,500 There was no other member of Jamal's family 531 00:49:57,500 --> 00:50:01,220 that was spied on prior to the murder. 532 00:50:01,220 --> 00:50:04,660 He was telling me what he's doing and what his connection, 533 00:50:04,660 --> 00:50:07,900 what is his movement, what is his state of mind. 534 00:50:07,900 --> 00:50:10,180 So you were communicating with him. A lot. 535 00:50:10,180 --> 00:50:13,420 They tracked my husband through me a long time back 536 00:50:13,420 --> 00:50:15,380 before they killed him. 537 00:50:15,380 --> 00:50:18,300 Because he was telling me, only me, everything. 538 00:50:18,300 --> 00:50:22,380 I didn't know this much - they track him through me all the time. 539 00:50:22,380 --> 00:50:23,980 Mm-hm. Yeah. 540 00:50:23,980 --> 00:50:26,620 Why is this all coming in my life? 541 00:50:26,620 --> 00:50:29,860 They did track Jamal and kill him through me. 542 00:50:29,860 --> 00:50:31,220 Long time back. 543 00:50:40,220 --> 00:50:43,860 This is a very crucial information, because we know for years 544 00:50:43,860 --> 00:50:47,420 that NSO Group has always say that if we learn one day 545 00:50:47,420 --> 00:50:50,340 about any kind of misuse from our spyware, 546 00:50:50,340 --> 00:50:52,860 used against dissidents, used against journalists, 547 00:50:52,860 --> 00:50:54,940 used against the human rights activists, 548 00:50:54,940 --> 00:50:57,620 we will then, of course, investigate the case. 549 00:50:57,620 --> 00:51:00,940 But in that case we're talking about, that's extremely serious. 550 00:51:00,940 --> 00:51:03,700 We're talking about someone who has been dismembered 551 00:51:03,700 --> 00:51:07,660 within the consulate, who has been killed within the consulate 552 00:51:07,660 --> 00:51:10,660 and we know that the relatives of that person 553 00:51:10,660 --> 00:51:12,340 have been targeted by Pegasus. 554 00:51:30,660 --> 00:51:33,700 It's important to rectify this story, 555 00:51:33,700 --> 00:51:37,980 which is that these technologies are necessary 556 00:51:37,980 --> 00:51:41,940 and exclusively used for good purposes 557 00:51:41,940 --> 00:51:44,980 and for fighting evil and for fighting crime 558 00:51:44,980 --> 00:51:47,460 and terrorism and all that. 559 00:51:47,460 --> 00:51:49,580 This is a bunch of lies for the most part, 560 00:51:49,580 --> 00:51:52,540 on the part of this industry who has a vested interest 561 00:51:52,540 --> 00:51:56,740 in exploiting as much as possible out of this to make money. 562 00:52:02,460 --> 00:52:04,500 When we started analysing the list, 563 00:52:04,500 --> 00:52:07,900 we immediately saw a lot of French numbers, 564 00:52:07,900 --> 00:52:11,620 more than 1,000 potentially targeted by Morocco. 565 00:52:11,620 --> 00:52:15,820 There were journalists, lawyers, activists, but not only. 566 00:52:15,820 --> 00:52:18,900 We also saw 15 members of the French government 567 00:52:18,900 --> 00:52:20,700 and the President Macron himself. 568 00:52:20,700 --> 00:52:23,580 At that moment, we immediately realised 569 00:52:23,580 --> 00:52:25,780 that this was going to be a bomb. 570 00:55:17,580 --> 00:55:19,100 Mm-hm. 571 00:57:01,220 --> 00:57:04,020 The last phase was very, very intense. 572 00:57:04,020 --> 00:57:06,460 This is precisely the moment where you knock on the door 573 00:57:06,460 --> 00:57:08,380 of the NSO Group and you told them 574 00:57:08,380 --> 00:57:10,580 we were investigating you for months. 575 00:57:10,580 --> 00:57:12,540 We know about your businesses 576 00:57:12,540 --> 00:57:15,380 and we have plenty of questions to ask you. 577 00:57:15,380 --> 00:57:18,820 And so we were thinking that we should get some answers 578 00:57:18,820 --> 00:57:22,820 in the next hours following the email, but nothing was happening. 579 00:57:22,820 --> 00:57:26,940 PHONE RINGS OUT 580 00:57:26,940 --> 00:57:30,180 Hello. This is Laurent Richard from Forbidden Stories. 581 00:57:30,180 --> 00:57:31,820 How are you doing? 582 00:57:31,820 --> 00:57:33,820 Yeah, I'm good. 583 00:57:33,820 --> 00:57:37,460 Yeah. Thank you for taking the time to answer. 584 00:57:38,580 --> 00:57:44,860 I was just wondering if you are planning to answer our question. 585 00:57:44,860 --> 00:57:47,260 Well, you can see it in your email now. 586 00:57:47,260 --> 00:57:48,620 EMAIL NOTIFICATION 587 00:57:48,620 --> 00:57:50,300 OK. I see it. 588 00:57:50,300 --> 00:57:53,020 Thank you. OK. Bye. Thank you. Bye. Bye. 589 00:57:53,020 --> 00:57:56,580 So, at the end, what we got was a very, very short email, 590 00:57:56,580 --> 00:58:00,620 very brief, where NSO Group were telling us that 591 00:58:00,620 --> 00:58:03,940 all your questions, all your information, everything is wrong. 592 00:58:03,940 --> 00:58:07,860 But what we can tell you that we are here just to save life, 593 00:58:07,860 --> 00:58:10,740 just to fight terrorism, and that's it. 594 00:58:10,740 --> 00:58:12,900 "Furthermore, as NSO has previously stated, 595 00:58:12,900 --> 00:58:15,620 "our technology was not associated in any way 596 00:58:15,620 --> 00:58:17,900 "with the heinous murder of Jamal Khashoggi. 597 00:58:17,900 --> 00:58:19,940 "This includes listening, monitoring, 598 00:58:19,940 --> 00:58:22,260 "tracking or collecting information..." 599 00:58:22,260 --> 00:58:25,900 At that time, here, there was a kind of calm, 600 00:58:25,900 --> 00:58:28,940 but the calm, you know, that is preceding the storm. 601 00:58:28,940 --> 00:58:32,580 But we discovered the day after that, NSO sent letters, 602 00:58:32,580 --> 00:58:34,940 letters from lawyers to most of the partners 603 00:58:34,940 --> 00:58:37,100 at the same time on all continents, 604 00:58:37,100 --> 00:58:40,180 to threaten them and to tell them that if you publish anything, 605 00:58:40,180 --> 00:58:41,860 we will sue you. 606 00:58:50,860 --> 00:58:54,420 Here was a company valued at over a billion dollars. 607 00:58:54,420 --> 00:58:57,060 The NSO Group and its clients, 608 00:58:57,060 --> 00:58:59,540 these governments, were not going to put their hands up 609 00:58:59,540 --> 00:59:02,020 and confess to this activity. 610 00:59:02,020 --> 00:59:04,660 They were fighting it as hard as they possibly could. 611 00:59:12,260 --> 00:59:16,580 It's a bit tense here, if I'm honest. Yeah. Yeah. 612 00:59:16,580 --> 00:59:17,900 Erm... 613 00:59:17,900 --> 00:59:22,100 We've had a provisional response from NSO to the Washington Post, 614 00:59:22,100 --> 00:59:23,980 and we will have the formal... 615 00:59:23,980 --> 00:59:27,580 ..another response from them to us in about... 616 00:59:27,580 --> 00:59:31,580 ..15, 20 minutes, so we're going to keep this call really quick. 617 00:59:31,580 --> 00:59:32,780 Erm... 618 00:59:32,780 --> 00:59:34,580 VOICEOVER: The stakes are really high 619 00:59:34,580 --> 00:59:36,300 when you do this kind of reporting. 620 00:59:36,300 --> 00:59:40,940 ..discussions around the public interest and exactly what it is... 621 00:59:40,940 --> 00:59:44,220 I mean, this was a story of global significance 622 00:59:44,220 --> 00:59:48,620 and the repercussions were about to be ignited. 623 00:59:48,620 --> 00:59:51,740 All going well, if we're proceeding with this project, 624 00:59:51,740 --> 00:59:55,540 I think the crunch point, really, is going to be in the next 12 hours. 625 00:59:55,540 --> 00:59:58,540 What do you mean, in the sense of IF we are proceeding, Paul? 626 01:00:00,540 --> 01:00:01,940 Yeah. 627 01:00:01,940 --> 01:00:03,580 Is that in doubt? 628 01:00:03,580 --> 01:00:05,660 Well, it's always... It's never... 629 01:00:05,660 --> 01:00:09,420 It's never confirmed until it's confirmed, right? 630 01:00:19,740 --> 01:00:21,540 EMAIL NOTIFICATION 631 01:01:30,140 --> 01:01:33,380 So, Paul, just to be 100% clear, you guys are ready to hit the button 632 01:01:33,380 --> 01:01:36,940 on a version of the story in...42 minutes? 633 01:01:36,940 --> 01:01:39,620 Of the heads of state story. Heads of state only. 634 01:01:39,620 --> 01:01:42,700 We're not ready now, but in 42 minutes we will be ready. 635 01:01:42,700 --> 01:01:45,100 LAUGHTER 636 01:01:45,100 --> 01:01:47,780 Here we were, simultaneously publishing 637 01:01:47,780 --> 01:01:49,860 17 different media outlets, 638 01:01:49,860 --> 01:01:53,100 all over the world in several different languages, 639 01:01:53,100 --> 01:01:56,860 all at the same time - on the same minute of the same day - 640 01:01:56,860 --> 01:01:58,860 after months of investigating. 641 01:02:02,180 --> 01:02:04,780 OK, so one other thing, I think I have made some... 642 01:02:07,780 --> 01:02:09,860 That's OK. I'll just say... 643 01:02:19,340 --> 01:02:21,380 We've done it. 644 01:02:28,060 --> 01:02:29,820 So the story is now live. 645 01:02:33,700 --> 01:02:37,540 REPORTERS: A joint investigation by 17 news outlets, including... 646 01:02:37,540 --> 01:02:39,180 Activists, lawyers and journalists 647 01:02:39,180 --> 01:02:41,100 are reportedly among those who've been targeted... 648 01:03:08,820 --> 01:03:15,660 What can be done to protect our country from commercial spyware, 649 01:03:15,660 --> 01:03:20,260 the kind of threat that is now being reported 650 01:03:20,260 --> 01:03:24,300 at the top of the news across the nation? 651 01:03:30,140 --> 01:03:33,380 Right, how are we doing, guys? One minute, one minute. Yeah? 652 01:03:35,940 --> 01:03:39,140 The NSO Group is only one company of many, 653 01:03:39,140 --> 01:03:42,500 and if one company smells this bad, what's happening with all the other? 654 01:03:42,500 --> 01:03:44,940 They're not security products. 655 01:03:44,940 --> 01:03:47,460 They're not providing any kind of protection, 656 01:03:47,460 --> 01:03:50,180 any kind of prophylactic. They don't make vaccines. 657 01:03:50,180 --> 01:03:53,220 The only thing they sell is the virus. And this is the problem. 658 01:03:53,220 --> 01:03:57,380 You know, these companies are extremely predatory. 659 01:03:58,620 --> 01:04:03,380 And their prey is us - collective, the global we. 660 01:04:03,380 --> 01:04:05,820 It doesn't matter who you are, it doesn't matter what you do. 661 01:04:05,820 --> 01:04:07,660 Your position isn't going to protect you. 662 01:04:07,660 --> 01:04:10,540 If you're Minister, Prime Minister, guess what? You're on the list. 663 01:04:10,540 --> 01:04:12,740 If you're a Supreme Court justice, you're on the list. 664 01:04:12,740 --> 01:04:16,740 If you're an ordinary person, guess what? You're on the list too. 665 01:04:16,740 --> 01:04:21,660 But we will not be safe until we change the game. 666 01:04:21,660 --> 01:04:24,180 If you want to protect yourself, you have to change the game. 667 01:04:24,180 --> 01:04:27,620 And the way we do that is by ending this trade, because it's a trade 668 01:04:27,620 --> 01:04:30,500 that ultimately is paid for in lives. 669 01:04:32,140 --> 01:04:35,180 There had been reporters who've been doing stories 670 01:04:35,180 --> 01:04:37,740 on Pegasus for years. 671 01:04:37,740 --> 01:04:43,180 This sort of tipped the scale, because it was in so many countries. 672 01:04:43,180 --> 01:04:47,140 It was against so many people in civil society 673 01:04:47,140 --> 01:04:49,780 who clearly were not terrorists or criminals. 674 01:05:45,140 --> 01:05:48,860 I was infected on 3rd August 2020 with Pegasus 675 01:05:48,860 --> 01:05:51,860 I believe at 3am in the morning. 676 01:05:53,340 --> 01:05:55,980 The fact that you can be hacked 677 01:05:55,980 --> 01:05:57,660 on British soil 678 01:05:57,660 --> 01:06:00,540 and that they can do that, 679 01:06:00,540 --> 01:06:02,900 it's frightening. It really is. 680 01:06:19,300 --> 01:06:22,380 My name is David Haigh from Detained International. 681 01:06:22,380 --> 01:06:25,100 And we founded the campaign to free the Dubai princess, 682 01:06:25,100 --> 01:06:28,420 Princess Latifa, in 2018. 683 01:06:28,420 --> 01:06:32,580 Hello, my name is Latifa al-Maktum, and I'm making this video 684 01:06:32,580 --> 01:06:35,820 because it could be the last video I make. 685 01:06:35,820 --> 01:06:37,460 Yeah. 686 01:06:40,780 --> 01:06:42,980 This video can help me 687 01:06:42,980 --> 01:06:46,220 because all my father cares about is his reputation. 688 01:06:46,220 --> 01:06:47,940 He will kill people 689 01:06:47,940 --> 01:06:49,540 to protect his own reputation. 690 01:06:49,540 --> 01:06:51,540 He... 691 01:06:51,540 --> 01:06:52,980 He only cares about himself 692 01:06:52,980 --> 01:06:54,500 and his ego. 693 01:06:58,780 --> 01:07:03,060 Here is an autocratic leader, massively powerful. 694 01:07:03,060 --> 01:07:08,140 And, as it turned out, Pegasus was used to spy on his personal 695 01:07:08,140 --> 01:07:10,220 family, his relatives. 696 01:07:10,220 --> 01:07:13,780 His ex-wife, at a minimum, possibly more people. 697 01:07:22,940 --> 01:07:26,500 But Princess Latifa has for a long time been, by her account, 698 01:07:26,500 --> 01:07:29,980 unhappy about her life in Dubai. 699 01:07:29,980 --> 01:07:35,460 She had been incarcerated, effectively, by her father's regime. 700 01:07:39,580 --> 01:07:43,740 The day after Princess Latifa went missing from Dubai, 701 01:07:43,740 --> 01:07:47,340 we saw her number emerge in the list. 702 01:07:47,340 --> 01:07:52,100 And in the days after that, as she was travelling toward India 703 01:07:52,100 --> 01:07:57,260 on this yacht, her friends, people she knew, people within her orbit, 704 01:07:57,260 --> 01:07:59,900 their phone numbers also appeared on the list. 705 01:07:59,900 --> 01:08:03,700 NSO's technology was, it seems, one of the tools 706 01:08:03,700 --> 01:08:08,260 that was being used by the state in a desperate attempt to find 707 01:08:08,260 --> 01:08:12,700 Princess Latifa, kidnap her and return her back to Dubai. 708 01:08:12,700 --> 01:08:15,780 Now, however they found her, that's what happened. 709 01:08:17,820 --> 01:08:20,780 Given how much David Haigh was working on the Latifa case, 710 01:08:20,780 --> 01:08:23,660 it wasn't a surprise when we discovered that there was 711 01:08:23,660 --> 01:08:25,660 Pegasus activity on his phone. 712 01:08:31,660 --> 01:08:35,820 We had recorded a lot of videos and a lot of evidence Latifa had 713 01:08:35,820 --> 01:08:39,780 that could be used to tell the world about her predicament - 714 01:08:39,780 --> 01:08:42,780 the fact that she was being held hostage, what was happening to her. 715 01:08:44,540 --> 01:08:47,140 It was effectively dynamite evidence on that phone. 716 01:08:59,540 --> 01:09:01,460 The fact that they know your location. 717 01:09:02,900 --> 01:09:06,020 Someone could be listening to us now and seeing what we're doing. 718 01:09:06,020 --> 01:09:10,900 And it's that, sitting in the back of your head every day. 719 01:09:19,180 --> 01:09:24,100 One day, NSO were attending the International Security Conference 720 01:09:24,100 --> 01:09:27,700 in London, and then I had a slightly mad idea - 721 01:09:27,700 --> 01:09:29,860 to think, "Well, actually I might go and visit them." 722 01:09:29,860 --> 01:09:31,220 So I applied for a pass, 723 01:09:31,220 --> 01:09:33,020 not thinking I'd get one because it is the 724 01:09:33,020 --> 01:09:35,740 International Security Conference. So you would have imagined they 725 01:09:35,740 --> 01:09:38,380 would check the name in the press, but they didn't. So I got a pass. 726 01:09:38,380 --> 01:09:39,900 I was very excited. 727 01:09:39,900 --> 01:09:43,340 So I got a camera on a pen and then went up to NSO. 728 01:09:43,340 --> 01:09:45,300 Hi, I wonder if you could help. 729 01:09:45,300 --> 01:09:48,180 My name's David Haigh, and that's the report from Amnesty 730 01:09:48,180 --> 01:09:50,180 saying Pegasus is on my phone. 731 01:09:50,180 --> 01:09:52,700 And I wondered if you could take it off for me? 732 01:09:52,700 --> 01:09:55,780 Or tell me how to take it off? First, we cannot. 733 01:09:55,780 --> 01:09:57,820 HE LAUGHS 734 01:09:57,820 --> 01:10:01,460 The meeting was strange because people were laughing. 735 01:10:01,460 --> 01:10:02,980 They weren't taking it seriously. 736 01:10:02,980 --> 01:10:05,100 I mean, I think it was because I went there very politely 737 01:10:05,100 --> 01:10:07,180 rather than shouting with banners. 738 01:10:07,180 --> 01:10:09,900 I would be very happy to help check that... 739 01:10:09,900 --> 01:10:12,100 Yeah. ..for you and be in touch. 740 01:10:12,100 --> 01:10:14,180 Can you give me your details, 741 01:10:14,180 --> 01:10:15,980 and someone from that...? Yeah, yeah. 742 01:10:15,980 --> 01:10:18,740 I will make sure they contact you in the next few days. 743 01:10:18,740 --> 01:10:20,820 Yeah, if you could, please. 744 01:10:24,140 --> 01:10:26,340 With credit to them, they did contact me. 745 01:10:26,340 --> 01:10:31,540 But then I think what I did see is they've effectively ghosted me now. 746 01:10:31,540 --> 01:10:34,860 And still, now, nothing has been done. 747 01:10:34,860 --> 01:10:36,860 No-one's been brought to justice. 748 01:10:36,860 --> 01:10:39,020 And everybody just looks the other way. 749 01:11:05,420 --> 01:11:09,220 This is a whole industry gone rogue 750 01:11:09,220 --> 01:11:13,420 in a deadly alliance with the worst dictators of this world, 751 01:11:13,420 --> 01:11:16,260 making human rights work impossible. 752 01:11:16,260 --> 01:11:19,460 And, Mr Commissioner, you had many nice words and strategies. 753 01:11:19,460 --> 01:11:21,740 First of all, it's about enforcement. 754 01:11:21,740 --> 01:11:24,860 Second of all, this whole thing has a foreign policy and human rights 755 01:11:24,860 --> 01:11:27,340 dimension you haven't even spoken about. 756 01:11:29,100 --> 01:11:32,780 We need a global ban on the export of these kinds of spyware. 757 01:11:32,780 --> 01:11:36,260 And we need to ask the tough questions to other governments, 758 01:11:36,260 --> 01:11:38,460 including those in Israel and Saudi Arabia. 759 01:13:36,580 --> 01:13:38,140 Thank you. 760 01:16:00,300 --> 01:16:03,980 REPORTER: A US appeals court is allowing WhatsApp messaging service 761 01:16:03,980 --> 01:16:06,980 to move forward with a lawsuit against NSO Group 762 01:16:06,980 --> 01:16:11,020 over allegedly targeting some of its servers in California 763 01:16:11,020 --> 01:16:14,660 to infect about 1,400 mobile devices with malware, 764 01:16:14,660 --> 01:16:17,260 a violation of state and federal law. 765 01:16:18,380 --> 01:16:22,180 All we've seen NSO Group is, deny, deny, deny, 766 01:16:22,180 --> 01:16:25,340 and that's shown up entirely through the legal process as well. 767 01:16:25,340 --> 01:16:27,780 There's an argument, and, at times, a lot of companies, 768 01:16:27,780 --> 01:16:30,020 they fix a security vulnerability and they move on 769 01:16:30,020 --> 01:16:32,020 because they don't want to draw attention 770 01:16:32,020 --> 01:16:35,220 to what could be a negative story about their product. 771 01:16:35,220 --> 01:16:40,300 But over the last three years, more companies invest more resources 772 01:16:40,300 --> 01:16:43,340 in finding and fixing vulnerabilities, 773 01:16:43,340 --> 01:16:46,580 take action against NSO Group, such as through lawsuits, 774 01:16:46,580 --> 01:16:49,100 where we had a number of technology companies, 775 01:16:49,100 --> 01:16:53,060 in addition to civil society, join our lawsuit with amicus briefs 776 01:16:53,060 --> 01:16:55,340 in support of our position, which is very helpful. 777 01:16:56,980 --> 01:16:58,740 The way I think about it 778 01:16:58,740 --> 01:17:02,860 is tech companies can and should do everything they can 779 01:17:02,860 --> 01:17:05,740 to make their software as secure as possible, 780 01:17:05,740 --> 01:17:09,380 but at the end of the day, if there's no consequences 781 01:17:09,380 --> 01:17:11,660 for people who try to break that software 782 01:17:11,660 --> 01:17:13,340 to commit human rights abuses, 783 01:17:13,340 --> 01:17:15,660 then there will always be people trying to do it. 784 01:17:22,420 --> 01:17:28,140 In Europe, the NSO scandal bounced back in December 2021 785 01:17:28,140 --> 01:17:31,500 because we were discovering new victims of the spyware 786 01:17:31,500 --> 01:17:34,620 and because new countries were accused of using Pegasus 787 01:17:34,620 --> 01:17:36,300 to spy on their opponents. 788 01:17:37,660 --> 01:17:40,820 REPORTER: Pegasus spyware is once again back in the spotlight, 789 01:17:40,820 --> 01:17:43,660 this time for targeting pro-independence supporters 790 01:17:43,660 --> 01:17:44,900 in Spain's Catalonia. 791 01:17:47,300 --> 01:17:50,780 In Spain, more than 60 victims of Pegasus were identified, 792 01:17:50,780 --> 01:17:53,660 including the Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, 793 01:17:53,660 --> 01:17:56,100 and Catalan European MPs, 794 01:17:56,100 --> 01:18:00,180 and, in Poland, Pegasus was suspected of being used 795 01:18:00,180 --> 01:18:01,780 by the ruling party 796 01:18:01,780 --> 01:18:06,300 to spy on its political opponents during the 2019 election campaign. 797 01:18:08,860 --> 01:18:11,220 REPORTER: Several members of Poland's opposition 798 01:18:11,220 --> 01:18:15,300 have produced evidence they were hacked by Pegasus Software. 799 01:18:15,300 --> 01:18:19,420 REPORTER: This scandal is being dubbed the Polish Watergate. 800 01:19:16,020 --> 01:19:17,780 Thank you, Mr Chairman. 801 01:19:17,780 --> 01:19:20,380 On behalf of NSO, I want to thank the members 802 01:19:20,380 --> 01:19:23,620 of the committee of inquiry for having us here today. 803 01:19:23,620 --> 01:19:26,220 Before we begin, we should note that there are limits 804 01:19:26,220 --> 01:19:29,180 to the information we can share with the committee and others. 805 01:19:29,180 --> 01:19:31,260 As you know, NSO is a private company 806 01:19:31,260 --> 01:19:34,900 providing expert controlled cyber intelligence technologies 807 01:19:34,900 --> 01:19:37,340 only in exclusive to government agencies 808 01:19:37,340 --> 01:19:39,940 for the purpose of preventing and investigating terrorism 809 01:19:39,940 --> 01:19:41,780 and other serious crimes. 810 01:19:41,780 --> 01:19:45,620 As a result, we are unable to share details about our customers 811 01:19:45,620 --> 01:19:48,300 as well as the crimes prevented and criminals tracked 812 01:19:48,300 --> 01:19:50,140 and apprehended using our technologies 813 01:19:50,140 --> 01:19:51,900 or trade secrets of the technology. 814 01:19:51,900 --> 01:19:54,980 I would like now to dispel a number of misconceptions 815 01:19:54,980 --> 01:19:57,660 that have surfaced in press and public debate 816 01:19:57,660 --> 01:20:01,020 with respect to our company's activities and technologies. 817 01:20:01,020 --> 01:20:03,980 It is not true that NSO Group operates Pegasus 818 01:20:03,980 --> 01:20:06,420 and collects information about individuals. 819 01:20:06,420 --> 01:20:11,660 It is not true that NSO Group sells its technology to private companies. 820 01:20:11,660 --> 01:20:15,860 The issues that came up about Jamal Khashoggi, 821 01:20:15,860 --> 01:20:18,940 about President Macron - 822 01:20:18,940 --> 01:20:21,180 the system was not used on those numbers. 823 01:20:21,180 --> 01:20:24,980 I will go immediately into the Q&A session of today's meeting. 824 01:20:24,980 --> 01:20:28,820 We already have about 15 members who've asked for the floor. 825 01:20:28,820 --> 01:20:32,140 Have United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia 826 01:20:32,140 --> 01:20:37,260 ever gone through your due diligence check, and have they passed it? 827 01:20:38,660 --> 01:20:41,820 As I said, I'm not going to respond to questions 828 01:20:41,820 --> 01:20:44,740 regarding specific potential customers. 829 01:20:44,740 --> 01:20:48,940 Given that UAE and Saudi Arabia have been using Pegasus software, 830 01:20:48,940 --> 01:20:52,500 who are legitimate actors to issue warrants in these countries 831 01:20:52,500 --> 01:20:54,980 according to your checks? 832 01:20:54,980 --> 01:20:56,660 Again, I repeat it again, 833 01:20:56,660 --> 01:20:58,340 I'm not going to respond to questions 834 01:20:58,340 --> 01:20:59,940 regarding specific customers. 835 01:21:09,340 --> 01:21:11,580 I cannot - and, again, I repeat, 836 01:21:11,580 --> 01:21:15,260 I cannot, because of various confidentiality and secrecy issues, 837 01:21:15,260 --> 01:21:17,020 I cannot get into specific questions 838 01:21:17,020 --> 01:21:19,220 regarding specific customers or specific cases. 839 01:21:43,900 --> 01:21:46,580 First of all, every customer that we sell to 840 01:21:46,580 --> 01:21:51,540 goes through the due diligence review in advance, 841 01:21:51,540 --> 01:21:55,500 and if...and very often if concerns are raised 842 01:21:55,500 --> 01:21:57,020 regarding the rule of law, 843 01:21:57,020 --> 01:21:59,380 because what we're looking at is also a rule of law, 844 01:21:59,380 --> 01:22:03,340 and any country that we've decided to sell to 845 01:22:03,340 --> 01:22:05,220 has been approved in this manner. 846 01:22:05,220 --> 01:22:07,300 Please, stop - stop the storytelling. 847 01:22:07,300 --> 01:22:09,380 I'm going to continue in Hungarian. 848 01:22:25,700 --> 01:22:27,140 Good question. 849 01:22:29,660 --> 01:22:31,940 Again, I said... 850 01:22:31,940 --> 01:22:34,420 Not again, it was a new question. 851 01:22:34,420 --> 01:22:35,740 So, please. 852 01:22:37,060 --> 01:22:41,260 I have not said... We have not said that we have determined recently 853 01:22:41,260 --> 01:22:43,860 that Hungary is or is not a secure country. 854 01:22:43,860 --> 01:22:45,420 You did consider it secure, 855 01:22:45,420 --> 01:22:47,100 because you sold the stuff to them. 856 01:22:47,100 --> 01:22:48,380 Excuse me... I said now... 857 01:22:48,380 --> 01:22:50,820 Let's keep a little bit of order in the meeting as well. 858 01:22:50,820 --> 01:22:54,140 I understand there is frustration, but it doesn't help us 859 01:22:54,140 --> 01:22:58,500 if we all start posing questions in a chaotic fashion. 860 01:22:58,500 --> 01:23:00,580 So, you have the concrete question. 861 01:23:00,580 --> 01:23:02,140 We have a concrete answer. 862 01:23:02,140 --> 01:23:04,980 And, please. Can you, as the chair, 863 01:23:04,980 --> 01:23:07,220 can you ask Mr Gelfand to either say 864 01:23:07,220 --> 01:23:09,900 that he is refusing to answer the questions, 865 01:23:09,900 --> 01:23:13,740 or answer the questions? Because you keep repeating the same thing, 866 01:23:13,740 --> 01:23:16,580 and there seems to be a complete disconnect between reality 867 01:23:16,580 --> 01:23:18,060 and between what you're saying. 868 01:23:18,060 --> 01:23:21,260 This is like... You know, it's an insult to our intelligence. Sorry. 869 01:24:18,340 --> 01:24:22,260 In some ways, we can talk about the impact on the company 870 01:24:22,260 --> 01:24:25,180 and say it's been really profound. 871 01:24:25,180 --> 01:24:29,260 A more pessimistic view would be to look at the entire industry, 872 01:24:29,260 --> 01:24:35,100 which remains unreformed, pretty wild, unregulated. 873 01:24:36,380 --> 01:24:39,220 NSO may vanish, 874 01:24:39,220 --> 01:24:45,380 but I feel no more secure talking in front of my phone now 875 01:24:45,380 --> 01:24:47,860 than I did when we first published. 876 01:24:49,540 --> 01:24:51,580 I don't think these issues have gone away.