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IN FRENCH:

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REPORTER: The biggest spying scandal
in cyber history.

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This investigation, which was
actually done by Forbidden Stories,

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which is kind of an investigative
group based in Paris,

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and shared with a number of
different news outlets.

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FRENCH REPORTER:

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A joint investigation
by 17 news outlets...

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SPANISH REPORTER:

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A massive data leak contained
over 50,000 phone numbers.

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A leak of 50,000 phone numbers

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belonging to some
big name politicians.

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IN MANDARIN:

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Pegasus.

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Pegasus. Pegasus.

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Pegasus spyware.

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Pegasus is like someone
over your shoulder.

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It can read everything
you're reading,

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it can watch everything
you're watching.

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And once the spyware

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is taking the control of your
device, basically you're trapped.

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REPORTER: This software has the
potential to use the microphone

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and camera to listen to
and even look at

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the owners of
iPhone and Android devices.

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Hello, can you hear me?

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I can hear you.
I don't see you.

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Hello. Hello, Paul. Hello?

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Hi, Donna.

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Hi, how are you? Hi, Donna.

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Good, and you?

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At that time, we quickly called
the Washington Post,

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the Suddeutsche Zeitung, and all
the partners to tell them

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that we were having access
to a list.

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We wanted to tell you about some
information we have

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and about a new project
we are starting.

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There is a lot that concerns India.
Ah.

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Some names in Mexico.

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Information about Hungary.

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Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

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What we needed at that moment
was to put together

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the best possible team.
We needed tech specialists.

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We needed people with good knowledge
of the spyware,

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and journalists with contacts in
the intelligence world.

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TANNOY: Elephant and Castle.
Change here...

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Paul Lewis is the head of the
investigative unit of the Guardian.

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The Guardian has been working
for years on Pegasus.

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The moment they mentioned
the numbers of phone numbers

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that they had, the quantity
of phone numbers,

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tens of thousands,

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I mean, my jaw just hit the floor.

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Now, we had small pieces of
the jigsaw of wrongdoing by NSO.

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Never before had anyone been able
to stitch that together

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and tell the whole story, so if
Forbidden Stories have got data

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that can identify not just who
the customers of NSO are,

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but potentially point
in the direction

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of who the targets are as well,
this is a game-changer.

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Israel has become the world leader
in this industry

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and exports these tools
all over the world

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and, if you like, NSO Group was
in many ways,

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you know, the jewel in the crown.

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Here was a company founded by
three guys in 2010,

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a tech start-up become a unicorn
that was incredibly successful,

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that claimed to have over
40 countries around the world

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buying its technology.

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We only sell it to government
or to entities that we know

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or we want to believe
that they will not misuse the tools.

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And this is how we check
the customer,

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this is how we diligence them.

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We have all the mechanism
to make sure

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that they are not
misusing the systems.

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All of us suspected that
if NSO Group was giving

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authoritarian and repressive regimes

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such a powerful instrument
of surveillance -

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you know, you can get into the phone
of anyone in the world

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and no-one's looking over your
shoulder because NSO Group says,

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"You have to sign this piece
of paper to agree

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"that this is just
for criminal investigations

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"and terrorist investigations,

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"but we're not going to check
how you use this technology."

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So you have a carte blanche.

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We had a kaleidoscope
of potential victims.

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But how do we prove that Pegasus
was on the phones?

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It's a piece of code that looks
very similar to all the others

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that you are running on your phone.

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It's just designed to do
something that it shouldn't.

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An investigation on a spyware
like this begins with a first case,

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begins with a patient zero,
so to speak,

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and that opens up everything.

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The very first cases,
they left their infrastructure

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that was connected
to NSO.Group.com -

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that was the first mistake.

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And then from there
you start saying,

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"OK, I've seen this infrastructure.

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"It's connected to the company,
quite evidently."

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These technologies
just evolve continuously,

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so it's a cat and mouse game
by nature, meaning that,

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but the unfortunate reality is that
against capabilities like those

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that Pegasus customers have,
there's not much you can do

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from a digital security perspective.
You can't really stop them.

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One of the very first things
that we did after getting access

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to the list was to cross-check
the list with our own contact list,

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and I did that with my personal
contact list.

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Immediately a phone number
popping up.

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That was the phone number
of a friend of mine,

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someone I know well for years.

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She's a journalist in Azerbaijan
and her name is Khadija Ismayilova.

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REPORTER: Her name
is Khadija Ismayilova.

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She's an award-winning
investigative reporter

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and an outspoken critic
of the government,

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renowned for her exposes
of corruption at the hands

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of the country's president.

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Khadija Ismayilova relentlessly kept
on exposing the wrongdoing

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and the corruption
of the Aliyev regime.

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The regime of Azerbaijan is
basically controlling everything,

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censoring everything. Human rights
activists, press freedom,

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everything is under the control
of that ruling party.

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And as soon as you start criticising
them, you will end up in jail.

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She showed how they were
having their hands

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into a big chunk
of the Azerbaijani economy.

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She was showing how they were taking
money in a covert way,

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how they were stealing money,
basically, from the people.

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IN AZERBAIJANI:

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SHOUTING

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MAN SHOUTS: Journalist! Journalist!

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After all this
investigative reporting,

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Khadija became a prime target
for the government in Baku

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and for the Aliyevs.

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In Azerbaijan, there is a culture
of blackmailing people,

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blackmailing political opponents,

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blackmailing human rights activists
and journalists.

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They can take your
personal pictures,

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your personal video
to blackmail you,

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and in 2012, Khadija Ismayilova
really paid the price for that.

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I remember the day when Khadija
called me and said,

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"Paul, something terrible happened.

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"I received this envelope
with photos

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"that are taken
in my bedroom illegally.

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"They probably had a hidden camera.

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"And they're blackmailing me
with these photos."

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Right next to the picture, there was
a small message saying to Khadija,

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"You should stop your investigation,

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"otherwise we will publish
those videos."

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But Khadija refused that deal

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and she decided
to continue her investigation.

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CLAMOURING

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REPORTER: She was sentenced to
seven-and-a-half years in prison

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for embezzlement and tax evasion,

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but her supporters say the trial
was politically motivated

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and accused the president of
cracking down on press freedoms.

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I don't know how to proceed
with Khadija

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because I don't want to put Khadija
in danger.

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But we wanted to...

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..to do some forensic of her device.

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The thing that is quite difficult
is how to get in touch with Khadija

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without communicating
on electronic device.

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According to what we see,
we see that Khadija is really

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one of the top persons of interest
for Azeri intelligence services,

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which is not a surprise, of course.

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This is very sensitive, right?
Yeah.

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This is very, very sensitive,
especially for her,

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because she's basically
on probation.

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So that's going to be a risk anyway.

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One day we learned that Khadija
was about to travel to Turkey

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for medical reasons. So clearly,
first, that was a kind of opening.

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So what we did after that is
that we decided to send one team

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over there first to tell Khadija
that we were having reasons

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to believe that she was surveilled,

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but as well that we found a phone
number in the list.

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Now I'm nervous.

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LAUGHTER

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I cannot stand still.

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Khadija! Khadija!

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How are you doing?

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INDISTINCT CONVERSATION

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Can we open the window?

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We can take this off, right?

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That's too long.

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So, basically,
what we have is list of

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the phone numbers that were targeted
in Azerbaijan.

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That's so cool.

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And...yeah, so we have about 1,000
numbers from Azerbaijan.

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And you're among them.

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Oh! And then we also have

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some people who are your friends
and your lawyers.

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Mm-hm, OK.

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And what does that program do?

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So what the program does is,

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it basically, without you knowing,

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it installs things
on your phone.

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And then it allows...

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Even if I didn't click on anything?

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Yeah, so the secrecy of this,
it's called Pegasus,

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and the secrecy of it is
that you don't actually see

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or you don't do anything.

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So before you had this,
you had to click on something

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to be infected. Yeah.

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In this case, it all happens
in the background and you have no

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00:14:33,660 --> 00:14:36,020
idea that you're infected.

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And when you're infected,
it's transmitting your messages,

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00:14:39,900 --> 00:14:43,820
your images, everything that's
happened on your phone,

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00:14:43,820 --> 00:14:47,380
including the signal, because they
have the phone itself.

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And it's legal to sell it? Yes.

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00:14:49,460 --> 00:14:54,340
So what we know is that most likely

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some time in 2018,
the government got it.

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OK. And we have a lot of data
from 2019.

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00:15:02,380 --> 00:15:04,860
And, you know, that was a big
year of protest,

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00:15:04,860 --> 00:15:07,940
you were on a hunger strike
with other people. Yeah.

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00:15:07,940 --> 00:15:09,460
You guys had a woman march,

208
00:15:09,460 --> 00:15:11,820
you were leading the march. Yeah.

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00:15:11,820 --> 00:15:13,500
Shoo...

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SHE LAUGHS

211
00:15:15,940 --> 00:15:19,180
It's kind of the most like you
in the country.

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00:15:19,180 --> 00:15:23,300
Well, why they are so idle,
I mean, that's...

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Oh.

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Mm.

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00:15:36,900 --> 00:15:42,780
So one way for us to verify
that what exactly was done

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00:15:42,780 --> 00:15:47,020
in your case would be to do
forensic on your phone.

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00:15:47,020 --> 00:15:53,340
So the question is whether you would
allow us to make a backup

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00:15:53,340 --> 00:15:59,380
of your phone and basically check
it for the traces of Pegasus.

219
00:16:00,940 --> 00:16:02,940
Yeah, yeah.

220
00:16:04,660 --> 00:16:09,660
Is there any way to avoid
this surveillance?

221
00:16:09,660 --> 00:16:12,500
Yes, we will set you up with a new
device

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00:16:12,500 --> 00:16:15,580
that you will be able to use...
On a phone.

223
00:16:15,580 --> 00:16:17,980
Is there a balcony?

224
00:16:17,980 --> 00:16:22,660
There must be some way
to do it.

225
00:16:23,740 --> 00:16:26,820
There are other ways to
communicate... Yeah.

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00:16:26,820 --> 00:16:27,940
..securely.

227
00:16:35,140 --> 00:16:36,220
It's like...

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..it makes you to want to live
in the...

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00:16:42,140 --> 00:16:43,940
..bubble.

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But then...

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..like, so no-one can enter,
like, in some sort of...

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00:17:23,700 --> 00:17:25,020
This is her phone.

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00:17:26,420 --> 00:17:28,260
You don't need any cables?

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00:17:28,260 --> 00:17:29,340
No. OK.

235
00:17:33,060 --> 00:17:36,500
Do you know if she still
has a backup?

236
00:17:36,500 --> 00:17:38,260
Yes, she does.
Yes, she does. OK.

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00:17:39,340 --> 00:17:42,180
Well, right now,
I'm trying to jailbreak the phone.

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00:17:42,180 --> 00:17:45,020
PHONE BEEPS

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00:17:45,020 --> 00:17:48,060
Hopefully it works.

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So right now, I am...

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00:18:00,980 --> 00:18:03,140
..navigating through the phone.

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I'm looking for things that might
have executed network activity

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00:18:11,100 --> 00:18:14,180
that is connectable
to the company,

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00:18:14,180 --> 00:18:18,540
any leftovers of malicious
executions,

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00:18:18,540 --> 00:18:21,540
accounts that we know of.

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00:18:21,540 --> 00:18:25,860
Anything essentially that tells me
the history of this phone.

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00:18:32,700 --> 00:18:36,780
That's interesting. That's not
something I've seen before.

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00:18:41,940 --> 00:18:47,980
We see processes that we know
are connected to Pegasus.

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00:18:47,980 --> 00:18:53,620
We'll see some message accounts
that are connected to the attacks,

250
00:18:53,620 --> 00:18:57,300
because this might indicate
what was the entry point.

251
00:18:57,300 --> 00:18:59,540
Oh, it was Apple Music?
What the fuck?

252
00:18:59,540 --> 00:19:01,860
Oh, really?

253
00:19:01,860 --> 00:19:03,420
That's weird.

254
00:19:04,780 --> 00:19:08,980
So they might have started
using Apple Music to exploit it.

255
00:19:11,380 --> 00:19:13,900
Erm...

256
00:19:13,900 --> 00:19:16,660
..I have to do some more digging
on this, as I need to look at

257
00:19:16,660 --> 00:19:19,540
what specifically
these applications are.

258
00:19:23,180 --> 00:19:26,420
It's definitely among the ones
most targeted.

259
00:19:39,540 --> 00:19:42,620
No, Khadija's coming!

260
00:19:42,620 --> 00:19:44,820
Hi, Claudio.

261
00:19:44,820 --> 00:19:46,180
Hi.

262
00:19:47,700 --> 00:19:50,780
So now tell me how bad it is.

263
00:19:50,780 --> 00:19:52,820
OK.

264
00:19:52,820 --> 00:19:57,740
There are definitely some records

265
00:19:57,740 --> 00:20:00,620
that indicate various points

266
00:20:00,620 --> 00:20:04,180
where the phone seemed
to have been compromised.

267
00:20:04,180 --> 00:20:05,820
Mm-hm.

268
00:20:05,820 --> 00:20:09,260
So I started feeling like I played
doctor in the 1300s,

269
00:20:09,260 --> 00:20:13,580
you know, like, I'm basically kind
of just keeping the death count...

270
00:20:13,580 --> 00:20:15,260
March of 2019...

271
00:20:15,260 --> 00:20:17,700
..I'm contributing to creating
a trauma here

272
00:20:17,700 --> 00:20:20,260
and I can see it in many cases.

273
00:20:20,260 --> 00:20:23,220
Like, I can see
it that they are... Right now,

274
00:20:23,220 --> 00:20:25,140
they're going to a dramatic moment.

275
00:20:25,140 --> 00:20:29,260
And I'm like that person
in the room that is breaking it.

276
00:20:31,140 --> 00:20:36,460
There are also some more recent
records from even as recent as early

277
00:20:36,460 --> 00:20:39,780
May of this year, so until a couple
of weeks ago.

278
00:20:39,780 --> 00:20:43,300
But all in all, it seems
like this probably extended

279
00:20:43,300 --> 00:20:46,060
between 2019 and 2020.

280
00:20:46,060 --> 00:20:47,940
2020, at the very least.

281
00:20:47,940 --> 00:20:51,100
I've been told that you will not
know

282
00:20:51,100 --> 00:20:55,620
what exactly had been monitored
or recorded.

283
00:20:55,620 --> 00:21:00,260
With these kinds of
monitoring technology,

284
00:21:00,260 --> 00:21:04,020
the point where they have that
level of access to the device,

285
00:21:04,020 --> 00:21:06,500
virtually everything is possible,
so...

286
00:21:10,580 --> 00:21:13,780
Yeah, thank you.
Have a good day, bye-bye.

287
00:21:13,780 --> 00:21:15,740
Bye. Bye.

288
00:21:16,900 --> 00:21:18,580
That's not great news. No.

289
00:21:30,420 --> 00:21:35,300
All night I've been thinking
about, what did I do with my phone?

290
00:21:35,300 --> 00:21:37,460
And I feel guilty.

291
00:21:37,460 --> 00:21:40,500
I feel guilty, too, for the messages
I've sent.

292
00:21:40,500 --> 00:21:46,940
I feel guilty for the information
sources who send me...

293
00:21:46,940 --> 00:21:52,860
..thinking that some encrypted
messaging ways are secure.

294
00:21:52,860 --> 00:21:57,260
They did it and they didn't know
that my phone was infected.

295
00:21:57,260 --> 00:22:02,860
I mean, my family members
are also victimised.

296
00:22:02,860 --> 00:22:06,900
The sources are victimised.

297
00:22:06,900 --> 00:22:11,180
Everyone. I mean, people
I've been working with.

298
00:22:11,180 --> 00:22:14,700
People who told me
they had private secrets.

299
00:22:14,700 --> 00:22:16,220
I victimised everyone.

300
00:22:16,220 --> 00:22:18,740
I mean, it's not just me, I...

301
00:22:18,740 --> 00:22:21,620
..I put so many people in danger.

302
00:22:22,940 --> 00:22:24,220
And...

303
00:22:26,380 --> 00:22:29,420
..and I'm angry.

304
00:22:29,420 --> 00:22:32,100
Again, I'm angry,
I'm angry with the government,

305
00:22:32,100 --> 00:22:36,620
I'm angry with the companies
that produce all these tools

306
00:22:36,620 --> 00:22:38,900
and sell it to the bad guys...

307
00:22:38,900 --> 00:22:42,220
..like Aliyev regime.

308
00:22:42,220 --> 00:22:43,820
It's...

309
00:22:45,700 --> 00:22:48,780
It's really... It's despicable,

310
00:22:48,780 --> 00:22:51,300
it's heinous, I don't know...

311
00:24:36,060 --> 00:24:40,900
Israel has the advantage of not only
developing new technologies

312
00:24:40,900 --> 00:24:43,460
and weaponry, but testing it live.

313
00:24:43,460 --> 00:24:48,460
And this is something Israel knows
it can use to sell outside.

314
00:24:55,300 --> 00:24:58,340
When you want to control a huge
population,

315
00:24:58,340 --> 00:25:00,580
like we do with Palestinians,

316
00:25:00,580 --> 00:25:04,300
you have to have assets everywhere,

317
00:25:04,300 --> 00:25:07,020
so everyone can be a target,

318
00:25:07,020 --> 00:25:10,300
because we don't want only the -
I don't know -

319
00:25:10,300 --> 00:25:16,100
terrorists from the Hamas, but also
maybe his neighbour or his cousin

320
00:25:16,100 --> 00:25:20,540
or the person who sells milk
in the corner of the street.

321
00:25:22,300 --> 00:25:25,820
If you want to recruit human agents,

322
00:25:25,820 --> 00:25:29,700
you need to collect
their weaknesses,

323
00:25:29,700 --> 00:25:32,860
things that you can use
to blackmail.

324
00:25:32,860 --> 00:25:38,820
And so part of what 8200 does
is to collect this blackmail

325
00:25:38,820 --> 00:25:41,420
potential information
about everybody.

326
00:25:43,660 --> 00:25:47,900
If you're gay or if you have
medical...special medical condition

327
00:25:47,900 --> 00:25:50,580
or you have financial problems

328
00:25:50,580 --> 00:25:53,660
or someone from your family has one
of those,

329
00:25:53,660 --> 00:25:57,900
then that's something we can use
against you to blackmail you

330
00:25:57,900 --> 00:25:59,740
and get you to cooperate.

331
00:26:13,140 --> 00:26:17,500
It's this kind of approach that you
see again in other countries

332
00:26:17,500 --> 00:26:20,580
used by the clients of NSO.

333
00:26:28,900 --> 00:26:32,100
One of the very first things that we
have been able to see

334
00:26:32,100 --> 00:26:35,420
reading the list was the very high
number of phone numbers

335
00:26:35,420 --> 00:26:36,940
coming from Mexico.

336
00:26:36,940 --> 00:26:39,540
But actually that was not
so surprising,

337
00:26:39,540 --> 00:26:40,980
because we knew for years

338
00:26:40,980 --> 00:26:42,220
that Mexico was one of

339
00:26:42,220 --> 00:26:43,700
the very first customers

340
00:26:43,700 --> 00:26:44,900
of the NSO Group.

341
00:26:47,180 --> 00:26:50,020
And we know as well since 2017

342
00:26:50,020 --> 00:26:53,620
that 19 people from the civil
society in Mexico

343
00:26:53,620 --> 00:26:58,620
were targeted by Pegasus,
including one very famous journalist

344
00:26:58,620 --> 00:27:02,820
called Carmen Aristegui, a
journalist who does work for CNN,

345
00:27:02,820 --> 00:27:05,620
who is extremely popular
in the country.

346
00:29:59,700 --> 00:30:02,580
PHONE RINGS

347
00:30:10,100 --> 00:30:13,540
Carmen Aristegui was already a known
victim of the spyware.

348
00:30:13,540 --> 00:30:15,420
So we asked her to join us
to investigate

349
00:30:15,420 --> 00:30:18,180
the Mexican part of the Pegasus
Project,

350
00:30:18,180 --> 00:30:21,620
and what we first asked her
was to help us to identify

351
00:30:21,620 --> 00:30:25,420
the thousands of Mexican numbers
appearing on the list.

352
00:37:53,460 --> 00:37:55,140
Right...

353
00:37:55,140 --> 00:37:59,220
There's a lot of evidence to suggest
that NSO Group

354
00:37:59,220 --> 00:38:03,540
had the direct backing and support
of Bibi Netanyahu's government.

355
00:38:07,860 --> 00:38:10,700
In order to sell its product to
governments around the world,

356
00:38:10,700 --> 00:38:12,380
it required permits,

357
00:38:12,380 --> 00:38:16,500
effectively licences from the
Israeli Defence Ministry.

358
00:38:16,500 --> 00:38:18,980
I decided several years ago
to turn Israel

359
00:38:18,980 --> 00:38:22,940
into one of the five cyber powers
of the world.

360
00:38:24,620 --> 00:38:26,460
In order for the companies
to develop,

361
00:38:26,460 --> 00:38:27,660
they need to make...

362
00:38:27,660 --> 00:38:29,060
What do they need to make?

363
00:38:30,060 --> 00:38:31,340
Money!

364
00:38:33,220 --> 00:38:35,380
They need to make money.

365
00:38:35,380 --> 00:38:39,060
Now, the easiest way to make sure
that they don't make money is,

366
00:38:39,060 --> 00:38:41,020
one, high taxes, right?

367
00:38:42,220 --> 00:38:43,540
What's the other one?

368
00:38:44,740 --> 00:38:46,020
Regulations.

369
00:38:47,100 --> 00:38:49,980
Have you ever heard of regulations?

370
00:38:49,980 --> 00:38:53,140
We have a problem with regulations.

371
00:38:53,140 --> 00:38:56,620
So the policy we have
is keep taxes low

372
00:38:56,620 --> 00:38:58,860
and keep regulations low.

373
00:38:58,860 --> 00:39:01,020
Minimise regulations.

374
00:39:01,020 --> 00:39:03,740
There is no industry
more susceptible

375
00:39:03,740 --> 00:39:06,980
and more inviting of regulations
than cybersecurity.

376
00:39:06,980 --> 00:39:08,260
It's like weapons.

377
00:39:08,260 --> 00:39:09,540
It is a weapon!

378
00:39:24,700 --> 00:39:28,180
Around us is a sea of dictators
and autocrats

379
00:39:28,180 --> 00:39:29,620
and kings and sultans.

380
00:39:30,740 --> 00:39:32,980
This is the neighbourhood we have.
We didn't choose it.

381
00:39:34,460 --> 00:39:36,700
But at the end of the day,
Iran is the biggest threat

382
00:39:36,700 --> 00:39:38,340
on Arabs and Israelis.

383
00:39:43,260 --> 00:39:46,420
Netanyahu wanted to forge a camp,

384
00:39:46,420 --> 00:39:49,580
a united front against Iran,

385
00:39:49,580 --> 00:39:52,460
and he would use many, many tools
in order to do that.

386
00:39:52,460 --> 00:39:55,020
One of the tools is giving
Israeli technology.

387
00:39:56,700 --> 00:39:59,860
NSO has a very attractive tool.

388
00:40:05,860 --> 00:40:07,660
AMITAI SIGHS

389
00:40:07,660 --> 00:40:10,460
# Do-do, do-do-do-do-do-do. #

390
00:41:17,420 --> 00:41:21,340
Jamal Khashoggi's murder,
really,

391
00:41:21,340 --> 00:41:24,740
in the history of the Post,

392
00:41:24,740 --> 00:41:26,340
stands out.

393
00:41:27,900 --> 00:41:31,620
Jamal Khashoggi was an opinion
writer for the Washington Post.

394
00:41:31,620 --> 00:41:34,980
Very gentle, soft-spoken man,

395
00:41:34,980 --> 00:41:37,620
willing to share his opinions.

396
00:41:37,620 --> 00:41:39,980
His voice became very important

397
00:41:39,980 --> 00:41:43,980
because he was the single most
important dissident

398
00:41:43,980 --> 00:41:46,020
writing about the Saudi regime.

399
00:41:47,620 --> 00:41:48,940
Jamal, let me start with you.

400
00:41:48,940 --> 00:41:51,340
You've compared your Crown Prince
to Putin,

401
00:41:51,340 --> 00:41:52,740
to Iran's supreme leader.

402
00:41:52,740 --> 00:41:54,300
You've said he's creating, quote,

403
00:41:54,300 --> 00:41:56,180
"an interesting form
of dictatorship".

404
00:41:56,180 --> 00:41:57,460
How so?

405
00:41:57,460 --> 00:41:59,180
I still see him as a reformer,

406
00:41:59,180 --> 00:42:01,860
but he is gathering all power
within his hand.

407
00:42:05,580 --> 00:42:08,740
As we speak today, there are Saudi
intellectuals

408
00:42:08,740 --> 00:42:09,980
and journalists jailed.

409
00:42:11,420 --> 00:42:13,620
His murder was so cold-blooded.

410
00:42:16,780 --> 00:42:21,180
Jamal Khashoggi went to the
consulate in Istanbul

411
00:42:21,180 --> 00:42:23,060
and then he disappeared.

412
00:42:24,780 --> 00:42:27,180
His close friends and family are
still trying to figure out

413
00:42:27,180 --> 00:42:28,420
what the situation is.

414
00:42:28,420 --> 00:42:30,220
They're waiting on an official
statement.

415
00:42:30,220 --> 00:42:31,940
I spoke to his fiancee,
who was also here

416
00:42:31,940 --> 00:42:34,620
and told us that they came here
to issue a number of documents

417
00:42:34,620 --> 00:42:36,020
so they could marry.

418
00:42:36,020 --> 00:42:38,100
Turkish officials believe
he was killed by agents

419
00:42:38,100 --> 00:42:40,260
of his own government
inside the consulate.

420
00:42:42,340 --> 00:42:46,020
They dispatched
an assassination team

421
00:42:46,020 --> 00:42:49,300
that landed in a plane
in the airport

422
00:42:49,300 --> 00:42:56,300
and came in cars
with tools to hack him up,

423
00:42:56,300 --> 00:42:58,340
hack his bones,

424
00:42:58,340 --> 00:43:02,220
and carry him out in a suitcase,
or suitcases.

425
00:43:02,220 --> 00:43:03,500
Uh!

426
00:43:07,220 --> 00:43:11,020
The word is that you sold Pegasus
to them,

427
00:43:11,020 --> 00:43:14,980
and then they turned it around
to get Khashoggi.

428
00:43:14,980 --> 00:43:17,980
Khashoggi murder is horrible -
really horrible.

429
00:43:17,980 --> 00:43:24,260
And therefore, when I first
heard their accusations

430
00:43:24,260 --> 00:43:28,060
that our technology been used
on Jamal Khashoggi,

431
00:43:28,060 --> 00:43:33,180
or on his relatives, I started
an immediate check about it.

432
00:43:33,180 --> 00:43:36,020
And I can tell you very clear.

433
00:43:36,020 --> 00:43:40,460
We had nothing to do with
this horrible murder.

434
00:43:43,820 --> 00:43:48,060
When Forbidden Stories
first contacted me,

435
00:43:48,060 --> 00:43:50,820
the minute we found out
about this list,

436
00:43:50,820 --> 00:43:54,860
the first thing we all did was
to check for any numbers

437
00:43:54,860 --> 00:43:57,020
related to Jamal Khashoggi.

438
00:43:58,420 --> 00:44:04,860
And right away, we found two numbers
associated with the two women

439
00:44:04,860 --> 00:44:06,460
closest to him in his life.

440
00:44:19,860 --> 00:44:22,020
His fiancee Hatice,

441
00:44:22,020 --> 00:44:25,220
who we'd all gotten to know
on television,

442
00:44:25,220 --> 00:44:26,780
because she was outside
the consulate

443
00:44:26,780 --> 00:44:28,820
when he didn't reappear.

444
00:44:28,820 --> 00:44:33,020
I'm hoping that they will let us
do forensics on her phone

445
00:44:33,020 --> 00:44:36,900
to see for certain whether she
was targeted.

446
00:44:36,900 --> 00:44:38,340
And maybe, if we get lucky,

447
00:44:38,340 --> 00:44:40,460
whether we can see what they took
out of her phone.

448
00:44:52,980 --> 00:44:54,740
They killed my future.

449
00:44:54,740 --> 00:44:56,500
They killed my life.

450
00:44:57,780 --> 00:45:00,820
I lost everything -
just the one day.

451
00:45:00,820 --> 00:45:05,020
I felt inside me something changed
and broke, you know?

452
00:45:06,300 --> 00:45:09,740
I remember the first days
after the murder.

453
00:45:10,780 --> 00:45:16,300
A lot of times, they try to hack
my email.

454
00:45:16,300 --> 00:45:17,580
Hmm.

455
00:45:17,580 --> 00:45:22,860
Do you feel like your phone
is doing anything strange?

456
00:45:22,860 --> 00:45:24,700
Do you think it could be hacked?

457
00:45:24,700 --> 00:45:26,140
We can test it.

458
00:45:26,140 --> 00:45:28,820
So we could do that if you wanted
to do it.

459
00:45:28,820 --> 00:45:31,060
We... OK, you can do that.

460
00:45:31,060 --> 00:45:32,700
OK, that'd be great.

461
00:45:32,700 --> 00:45:35,740
Well, we just need to plug your
phone into our computer.

462
00:45:35,740 --> 00:45:37,860
OK. So maybe we do that.

463
00:45:37,860 --> 00:45:39,140
Great.

464
00:45:50,260 --> 00:45:51,980
Hello?

465
00:45:51,980 --> 00:45:53,620
Claudio?

466
00:45:53,620 --> 00:45:54,980
Hi.

467
00:45:54,980 --> 00:45:56,980
It's Dana.

468
00:45:56,980 --> 00:45:58,980
Hi, how are you?

469
00:45:58,980 --> 00:46:00,980
I don't know. You tell me.

470
00:46:00,980 --> 00:46:05,180
So I checked both the uploads.

471
00:46:05,180 --> 00:46:06,380
Er...

472
00:46:06,380 --> 00:46:09,020
The new one seems clean to me.

473
00:46:10,820 --> 00:46:13,420
The old one, however,
has some traces

474
00:46:13,420 --> 00:46:16,500
on 6th October 2018.

475
00:46:16,500 --> 00:46:20,100
Seems to have been a first
compromise,

476
00:46:20,100 --> 00:46:22,980
which was followed by some
additional traces

477
00:46:22,980 --> 00:46:25,300
on the 9th and then on the 12th.

478
00:46:25,300 --> 00:46:29,420
There's also an additional record
in June of 2019,

479
00:46:29,420 --> 00:46:33,300
but that seems to be probably
a failed attempt.

480
00:46:33,300 --> 00:46:35,900
And I don't see anything
following that.

481
00:46:35,900 --> 00:46:37,260
OK.

482
00:46:41,100 --> 00:46:42,660
And then we find out the date,

483
00:46:42,660 --> 00:46:45,780
which is four days after his
murder...

484
00:46:47,100 --> 00:46:49,260
..when she's still outside
the embassy,

485
00:46:49,260 --> 00:46:52,580
trying to figure out what's
happening.

486
00:46:52,580 --> 00:46:55,340
And it just seemed like
such a ballsy move

487
00:46:55,340 --> 00:46:57,460
on the Saudis' part,

488
00:46:57,460 --> 00:47:01,980
to surveil the person who has become
the public face

489
00:47:01,980 --> 00:47:04,020
of his disappearance.

490
00:47:14,020 --> 00:47:18,020
We learnt that Jamal had a
complicated personal life.

491
00:47:18,020 --> 00:47:20,220
The other phone number
that we discovered

492
00:47:20,220 --> 00:47:24,460
was a woman named Hanan El-Atr.

493
00:47:25,620 --> 00:47:29,700
Hanan Atr is probably the
least-known character

494
00:47:29,700 --> 00:47:32,700
in Jamal Khashoggi's life.

495
00:47:32,700 --> 00:47:34,740
She's actually his wife,

496
00:47:34,740 --> 00:47:36,860
and most people have not
heard of her.

497
00:47:38,540 --> 00:47:42,460
He actually had secretly married
in the United States

498
00:47:42,460 --> 00:47:44,260
in an Islamic ceremony.

499
00:47:45,940 --> 00:47:49,260
It took me a long time
to find Hanan.

500
00:47:49,260 --> 00:47:53,580
And what I discovered is Hanan
is living in hiding

501
00:47:53,580 --> 00:47:58,500
in the United States while she waits
for her political asylum case.

502
00:48:02,180 --> 00:48:05,340
She was a flight attendant
for Emirates Airlines.

503
00:48:05,340 --> 00:48:06,900
And so she flew all over the world

504
00:48:06,900 --> 00:48:09,860
and she was communicating with him
on foreign phones.

505
00:48:15,300 --> 00:48:18,180
He was so happy, and they were
so happy as well.

506
00:48:22,140 --> 00:48:25,420
This is on his birthday in
a restaurant in Washington,

507
00:48:25,420 --> 00:48:27,940
and his friend Maggie behind us -

508
00:48:27,940 --> 00:48:30,420
she made the birthday party.

509
00:48:30,420 --> 00:48:35,100
There's all of his friends
around us.

510
00:48:35,100 --> 00:48:37,980
This last birthday in his life.

511
00:48:37,980 --> 00:48:42,220
He was careful, but he didn't
realise maybe, my device,

512
00:48:42,220 --> 00:48:43,700
it is much dangerous.

513
00:48:43,700 --> 00:48:45,180
And I didn't know as well.

514
00:48:45,180 --> 00:48:48,740
He suspect but he's not sure -
and I am not sure as well.

515
00:48:52,380 --> 00:48:56,300
She allowed me to
download her phone...

516
00:48:57,620 --> 00:49:01,300
..to send a copy to Bill Marczak
at Citizen Lab,

517
00:49:01,300 --> 00:49:05,340
who also conducts
forensic analysis of phones.

518
00:49:09,060 --> 00:49:13,260
So we've set up a meeting with Hanan
and her lawyer, Randa Fahmy,

519
00:49:13,260 --> 00:49:16,860
and Bill's going to Zoom in from
California, where he's working.

520
00:49:21,300 --> 00:49:23,580
What I did is I analysed,

521
00:49:23,580 --> 00:49:27,580
erm, all the available data
on two Android phones

522
00:49:27,580 --> 00:49:30,740
and one laptop belonging to Hanan.

523
00:49:30,740 --> 00:49:32,660
On one of the phones,

524
00:49:32,660 --> 00:49:37,420
it appears that there
were two separate links

525
00:49:37,420 --> 00:49:40,380
to the Pegasus spyware
that were actually opened.

526
00:49:40,380 --> 00:49:42,300
There are a number...

527
00:49:42,300 --> 00:49:45,180
In fact, there are
seven text messages

528
00:49:45,180 --> 00:49:50,900
from a period of November 8th
to November 26th 2017.

529
00:49:50,900 --> 00:49:53,820
We have the smoking gun
from Hanan's phone.

530
00:49:53,820 --> 00:49:57,500
There was no other member
of Jamal's family

531
00:49:57,500 --> 00:50:01,220
that was spied on
prior to the murder.

532
00:50:01,220 --> 00:50:04,660
He was telling me what he's doing
and what his connection,

533
00:50:04,660 --> 00:50:07,900
what is his movement,
what is his state of mind.

534
00:50:07,900 --> 00:50:10,180
So you were communicating
with him. A lot.

535
00:50:10,180 --> 00:50:13,420
They tracked my husband
through me a long time back

536
00:50:13,420 --> 00:50:15,380
before they killed him.

537
00:50:15,380 --> 00:50:18,300
Because he was telling me,
only me, everything.

538
00:50:18,300 --> 00:50:22,380
I didn't know this much - they track
him through me all the time.

539
00:50:22,380 --> 00:50:23,980
Mm-hm. Yeah.

540
00:50:23,980 --> 00:50:26,620
Why is this all coming in my life?

541
00:50:26,620 --> 00:50:29,860
They did track Jamal and
kill him through me.

542
00:50:29,860 --> 00:50:31,220
Long time back.

543
00:50:40,220 --> 00:50:43,860
This is a very crucial information,
because we know for years

544
00:50:43,860 --> 00:50:47,420
that NSO Group has always say
that if we learn one day

545
00:50:47,420 --> 00:50:50,340
about any kind of misuse
from our spyware,

546
00:50:50,340 --> 00:50:52,860
used against dissidents,
used against journalists,

547
00:50:52,860 --> 00:50:54,940
used against the
human rights activists,

548
00:50:54,940 --> 00:50:57,620
we will then, of course,
investigate the case.

549
00:50:57,620 --> 00:51:00,940
But in that case we're talking
about, that's extremely serious.

550
00:51:00,940 --> 00:51:03,700
We're talking about someone
who has been dismembered

551
00:51:03,700 --> 00:51:07,660
within the consulate, who has been
killed within the consulate

552
00:51:07,660 --> 00:51:10,660
and we know that
the relatives of that person

553
00:51:10,660 --> 00:51:12,340
have been targeted by Pegasus.

554
00:51:30,660 --> 00:51:33,700
It's important to rectify
this story,

555
00:51:33,700 --> 00:51:37,980
which is that these technologies
are necessary

556
00:51:37,980 --> 00:51:41,940
and exclusively used
for good purposes

557
00:51:41,940 --> 00:51:44,980
and for fighting evil
and for fighting crime

558
00:51:44,980 --> 00:51:47,460
and terrorism and all that.

559
00:51:47,460 --> 00:51:49,580
This is a bunch of lies
for the most part,

560
00:51:49,580 --> 00:51:52,540
on the part of this industry
who has a vested interest

561
00:51:52,540 --> 00:51:56,740
in exploiting as much as possible
out of this to make money.

562
00:52:02,460 --> 00:52:04,500
When we started analysing the list,

563
00:52:04,500 --> 00:52:07,900
we immediately saw
a lot of French numbers,

564
00:52:07,900 --> 00:52:11,620
more than 1,000 potentially
targeted by Morocco.

565
00:52:11,620 --> 00:52:15,820
There were journalists,
lawyers, activists, but not only.

566
00:52:15,820 --> 00:52:18,900
We also saw 15 members
of the French government

567
00:52:18,900 --> 00:52:20,700
and the President Macron himself.

568
00:52:20,700 --> 00:52:23,580
At that moment,
we immediately realised

569
00:52:23,580 --> 00:52:25,780
that this was going to be a bomb.

570
00:55:17,580 --> 00:55:19,100
Mm-hm.

571
00:57:01,220 --> 00:57:04,020
The last phase was
very, very intense.

572
00:57:04,020 --> 00:57:06,460
This is precisely the moment
where you knock on the door

573
00:57:06,460 --> 00:57:08,380
of the NSO Group and you told them

574
00:57:08,380 --> 00:57:10,580
we were investigating you
for months.

575
00:57:10,580 --> 00:57:12,540
We know about your businesses

576
00:57:12,540 --> 00:57:15,380
and we have plenty
of questions to ask you.

577
00:57:15,380 --> 00:57:18,820
And so we were thinking
that we should get some answers

578
00:57:18,820 --> 00:57:22,820
in the next hours following the
email, but nothing was happening.

579
00:57:22,820 --> 00:57:26,940
PHONE RINGS OUT

580
00:57:26,940 --> 00:57:30,180
Hello. This is Laurent Richard
from Forbidden Stories.

581
00:57:30,180 --> 00:57:31,820
How are you doing?

582
00:57:31,820 --> 00:57:33,820
Yeah, I'm good.

583
00:57:33,820 --> 00:57:37,460
Yeah. Thank you for taking
the time to answer.

584
00:57:38,580 --> 00:57:44,860
I was just wondering if you are
planning to answer our question.

585
00:57:44,860 --> 00:57:47,260
Well, you can see it
in your email now.

586
00:57:47,260 --> 00:57:48,620
EMAIL NOTIFICATION

587
00:57:48,620 --> 00:57:50,300
OK. I see it.

588
00:57:50,300 --> 00:57:53,020
Thank you. OK. Bye.
Thank you. Bye. Bye.

589
00:57:53,020 --> 00:57:56,580
So, at the end, what we got
was a very, very short email,

590
00:57:56,580 --> 00:58:00,620
very brief, where NSO Group
were telling us that

591
00:58:00,620 --> 00:58:03,940
all your questions, all your
information, everything is wrong.

592
00:58:03,940 --> 00:58:07,860
But what we can tell you that
we are here just to save life,

593
00:58:07,860 --> 00:58:10,740
just to fight terrorism,
and that's it.

594
00:58:10,740 --> 00:58:12,900
"Furthermore, as NSO
has previously stated,

595
00:58:12,900 --> 00:58:15,620
"our technology was not
associated in any way

596
00:58:15,620 --> 00:58:17,900
"with the heinous murder of
Jamal Khashoggi.

597
00:58:17,900 --> 00:58:19,940
"This includes listening,
monitoring,

598
00:58:19,940 --> 00:58:22,260
"tracking or collecting
information..."

599
00:58:22,260 --> 00:58:25,900
At that time, here,
there was a kind of calm,

600
00:58:25,900 --> 00:58:28,940
but the calm, you know,
that is preceding the storm.

601
00:58:28,940 --> 00:58:32,580
But we discovered the day after
that, NSO sent letters,

602
00:58:32,580 --> 00:58:34,940
letters from lawyers
to most of the partners

603
00:58:34,940 --> 00:58:37,100
at the same time on all continents,

604
00:58:37,100 --> 00:58:40,180
to threaten them and to tell them
that if you publish anything,

605
00:58:40,180 --> 00:58:41,860
we will sue you.

606
00:58:50,860 --> 00:58:54,420
Here was a company valued
at over a billion dollars.

607
00:58:54,420 --> 00:58:57,060
The NSO Group and its clients,

608
00:58:57,060 --> 00:58:59,540
these governments, were not
going to put their hands up

609
00:58:59,540 --> 00:59:02,020
and confess to this activity.

610
00:59:02,020 --> 00:59:04,660
They were fighting it as hard
as they possibly could.

611
00:59:12,260 --> 00:59:16,580
It's a bit tense here,
if I'm honest. Yeah. Yeah.

612
00:59:16,580 --> 00:59:17,900
Erm...

613
00:59:17,900 --> 00:59:22,100
We've had a provisional response
from NSO to the Washington Post,

614
00:59:22,100 --> 00:59:23,980
and we will have the formal...

615
00:59:23,980 --> 00:59:27,580
..another response
from them to us in about...

616
00:59:27,580 --> 00:59:31,580
..15, 20 minutes, so we're going
to keep this call really quick.

617
00:59:31,580 --> 00:59:32,780
Erm...

618
00:59:32,780 --> 00:59:34,580
VOICEOVER: The stakes
are really high

619
00:59:34,580 --> 00:59:36,300
when you do this kind of reporting.

620
00:59:36,300 --> 00:59:40,940
..discussions around the public
interest and exactly what it is...

621
00:59:40,940 --> 00:59:44,220
I mean, this was a story
of global significance

622
00:59:44,220 --> 00:59:48,620
and the repercussions
were about to be ignited.

623
00:59:48,620 --> 00:59:51,740
All going well, if we're proceeding
with this project,

624
00:59:51,740 --> 00:59:55,540
I think the crunch point, really,
is going to be in the next 12 hours.

625
00:59:55,540 --> 00:59:58,540
What do you mean, in the sense of
IF we are proceeding, Paul?

626
01:00:00,540 --> 01:00:01,940
Yeah.

627
01:00:01,940 --> 01:00:03,580
Is that in doubt?

628
01:00:03,580 --> 01:00:05,660
Well, it's always... It's never...

629
01:00:05,660 --> 01:00:09,420
It's never confirmed
until it's confirmed, right?

630
01:00:19,740 --> 01:00:21,540
EMAIL NOTIFICATION

631
01:01:30,140 --> 01:01:33,380
So, Paul, just to be 100% clear,
you guys are ready to hit the button

632
01:01:33,380 --> 01:01:36,940
on a version of the story
in...42 minutes?

633
01:01:36,940 --> 01:01:39,620
Of the heads of state story.
Heads of state only.

634
01:01:39,620 --> 01:01:42,700
We're not ready now, but in 42
minutes we will be ready.

635
01:01:42,700 --> 01:01:45,100
LAUGHTER

636
01:01:45,100 --> 01:01:47,780
Here we were,
simultaneously publishing

637
01:01:47,780 --> 01:01:49,860
17 different media outlets,

638
01:01:49,860 --> 01:01:53,100
all over the world in several
different languages,

639
01:01:53,100 --> 01:01:56,860
all at the same time - on the
same minute of the same day -

640
01:01:56,860 --> 01:01:58,860
after months of investigating.

641
01:02:02,180 --> 01:02:04,780
OK, so one other thing, I think
I have made some...

642
01:02:07,780 --> 01:02:09,860
That's OK. I'll just say...

643
01:02:19,340 --> 01:02:21,380
We've done it.

644
01:02:28,060 --> 01:02:29,820
So the story is now live.

645
01:02:33,700 --> 01:02:37,540
REPORTERS: A joint investigation by
17 news outlets, including...

646
01:02:37,540 --> 01:02:39,180
Activists, lawyers and journalists

647
01:02:39,180 --> 01:02:41,100
are reportedly among
those who've been targeted...

648
01:03:08,820 --> 01:03:15,660
What can be done to protect our
country from commercial spyware,

649
01:03:15,660 --> 01:03:20,260
the kind of threat that is now
being reported

650
01:03:20,260 --> 01:03:24,300
at the top of the news
across the nation?

651
01:03:30,140 --> 01:03:33,380
Right, how are we doing, guys?
One minute, one minute. Yeah?

652
01:03:35,940 --> 01:03:39,140
The NSO Group is only one company
of many,

653
01:03:39,140 --> 01:03:42,500
and if one company smells this bad,
what's happening with all the other?

654
01:03:42,500 --> 01:03:44,940
They're not security products.

655
01:03:44,940 --> 01:03:47,460
They're not providing any kind
of protection,

656
01:03:47,460 --> 01:03:50,180
any kind of prophylactic.
They don't make vaccines.

657
01:03:50,180 --> 01:03:53,220
The only thing they sell is the
virus. And this is the problem.

658
01:03:53,220 --> 01:03:57,380
You know, these companies are
extremely predatory.

659
01:03:58,620 --> 01:04:03,380
And their prey is us -
collective, the global we.

660
01:04:03,380 --> 01:04:05,820
It doesn't matter who you are,
it doesn't matter what you do.

661
01:04:05,820 --> 01:04:07,660
Your position isn't going
to protect you.

662
01:04:07,660 --> 01:04:10,540
If you're Minister, Prime Minister,
guess what? You're on the list.

663
01:04:10,540 --> 01:04:12,740
If you're a Supreme Court justice,
you're on the list.

664
01:04:12,740 --> 01:04:16,740
If you're an ordinary person, guess
what? You're on the list too.

665
01:04:16,740 --> 01:04:21,660
But we will not be safe
until we change the game.

666
01:04:21,660 --> 01:04:24,180
If you want to protect yourself,
you have to change the game.

667
01:04:24,180 --> 01:04:27,620
And the way we do that is by ending
this trade, because it's a trade

668
01:04:27,620 --> 01:04:30,500
that ultimately is paid
for in lives.

669
01:04:32,140 --> 01:04:35,180
There had been reporters
who've been doing stories

670
01:04:35,180 --> 01:04:37,740
on Pegasus for years.

671
01:04:37,740 --> 01:04:43,180
This sort of tipped the scale,
because it was in so many countries.

672
01:04:43,180 --> 01:04:47,140
It was against so many people in
civil society

673
01:04:47,140 --> 01:04:49,780
who clearly were not
terrorists or criminals.

674
01:05:45,140 --> 01:05:48,860
I was infected on 3rd August 2020
with Pegasus

675
01:05:48,860 --> 01:05:51,860
I believe at 3am in the morning.

676
01:05:53,340 --> 01:05:55,980
The fact that you can be hacked

677
01:05:55,980 --> 01:05:57,660
on British soil

678
01:05:57,660 --> 01:06:00,540
and that they can do that,

679
01:06:00,540 --> 01:06:02,900
it's frightening.
It really is.

680
01:06:19,300 --> 01:06:22,380
My name is David Haigh
from Detained International.

681
01:06:22,380 --> 01:06:25,100
And we founded the campaign to free
the Dubai princess,

682
01:06:25,100 --> 01:06:28,420
Princess Latifa, in 2018.

683
01:06:28,420 --> 01:06:32,580
Hello, my name is Latifa al-Maktum,
and I'm making this video

684
01:06:32,580 --> 01:06:35,820
because it could be the
last video I make.

685
01:06:35,820 --> 01:06:37,460
Yeah.

686
01:06:40,780 --> 01:06:42,980
This video can help me

687
01:06:42,980 --> 01:06:46,220
because all my father cares
about is his reputation.

688
01:06:46,220 --> 01:06:47,940
He will kill people

689
01:06:47,940 --> 01:06:49,540
to protect his own reputation.

690
01:06:49,540 --> 01:06:51,540
He...

691
01:06:51,540 --> 01:06:52,980
He only cares about himself

692
01:06:52,980 --> 01:06:54,500
and his ego.

693
01:06:58,780 --> 01:07:03,060
Here is an autocratic leader,
massively powerful.

694
01:07:03,060 --> 01:07:08,140
And, as it turned out, Pegasus
was used to spy on his personal

695
01:07:08,140 --> 01:07:10,220
family, his relatives.

696
01:07:10,220 --> 01:07:13,780
His ex-wife, at a minimum,
possibly more people.

697
01:07:22,940 --> 01:07:26,500
But Princess Latifa has for
a long time been, by her account,

698
01:07:26,500 --> 01:07:29,980
unhappy about her life in Dubai.

699
01:07:29,980 --> 01:07:35,460
She had been incarcerated,
effectively, by her father's regime.

700
01:07:39,580 --> 01:07:43,740
The day after Princess Latifa
went missing from Dubai,

701
01:07:43,740 --> 01:07:47,340
we saw her number emerge
in the list.

702
01:07:47,340 --> 01:07:52,100
And in the days after that,
as she was travelling toward India

703
01:07:52,100 --> 01:07:57,260
on this yacht, her friends, people
she knew, people within her orbit,

704
01:07:57,260 --> 01:07:59,900
their phone numbers also
appeared on the list.

705
01:07:59,900 --> 01:08:03,700
NSO's technology was, it seems,
one of the tools

706
01:08:03,700 --> 01:08:08,260
that was being used by the state
in a desperate attempt to find

707
01:08:08,260 --> 01:08:12,700
Princess Latifa, kidnap her
and return her back to Dubai.

708
01:08:12,700 --> 01:08:15,780
Now, however they found her,
that's what happened.

709
01:08:17,820 --> 01:08:20,780
Given how much David Haigh
was working on the Latifa case,

710
01:08:20,780 --> 01:08:23,660
it wasn't a surprise when
we discovered that there was

711
01:08:23,660 --> 01:08:25,660
Pegasus activity on his phone.

712
01:08:31,660 --> 01:08:35,820
We had recorded a lot of videos
and a lot of evidence Latifa had

713
01:08:35,820 --> 01:08:39,780
that could be used to tell
the world about her predicament -

714
01:08:39,780 --> 01:08:42,780
the fact that she was being held
hostage, what was happening to her.

715
01:08:44,540 --> 01:08:47,140
It was effectively dynamite
evidence on that phone.

716
01:08:59,540 --> 01:09:01,460
The fact that they know
your location.

717
01:09:02,900 --> 01:09:06,020
Someone could be listening to us
now and seeing what we're doing.

718
01:09:06,020 --> 01:09:10,900
And it's that, sitting in the back
of your head every day.

719
01:09:19,180 --> 01:09:24,100
One day, NSO were attending the
International Security Conference

720
01:09:24,100 --> 01:09:27,700
in London, and then I had
a slightly mad idea -

721
01:09:27,700 --> 01:09:29,860
to think, "Well, actually
I might go and visit them."

722
01:09:29,860 --> 01:09:31,220
So I applied for a pass,

723
01:09:31,220 --> 01:09:33,020
not thinking I'd get
one because it is the

724
01:09:33,020 --> 01:09:35,740
International Security Conference.
So you would have imagined they

725
01:09:35,740 --> 01:09:38,380
would check the name in the press,
but they didn't. So I got a pass.

726
01:09:38,380 --> 01:09:39,900
I was very excited.

727
01:09:39,900 --> 01:09:43,340
So I got a camera on a pen
and then went up to NSO.

728
01:09:43,340 --> 01:09:45,300
Hi, I wonder if you could help.

729
01:09:45,300 --> 01:09:48,180
My name's David Haigh, and that's
the report from Amnesty

730
01:09:48,180 --> 01:09:50,180
saying Pegasus is on my phone.

731
01:09:50,180 --> 01:09:52,700
And I wondered if you could take it
off for me?

732
01:09:52,700 --> 01:09:55,780
Or tell me how to take it off?
First, we cannot.

733
01:09:55,780 --> 01:09:57,820
HE LAUGHS

734
01:09:57,820 --> 01:10:01,460
The meeting was strange
because people were laughing.

735
01:10:01,460 --> 01:10:02,980
They weren't taking it seriously.

736
01:10:02,980 --> 01:10:05,100
I mean, I think it was because
I went there very politely

737
01:10:05,100 --> 01:10:07,180
rather than shouting with banners.

738
01:10:07,180 --> 01:10:09,900
I would be very happy to
help check that...

739
01:10:09,900 --> 01:10:12,100
Yeah. ..for you and be in touch.

740
01:10:12,100 --> 01:10:14,180
Can you give me your details,

741
01:10:14,180 --> 01:10:15,980
and someone from that...?
Yeah, yeah.

742
01:10:15,980 --> 01:10:18,740
I will make sure they contact you
in the next few days.

743
01:10:18,740 --> 01:10:20,820
Yeah, if you could, please.

744
01:10:24,140 --> 01:10:26,340
With credit to them, they
did contact me.

745
01:10:26,340 --> 01:10:31,540
But then I think what I did see is
they've effectively ghosted me now.

746
01:10:31,540 --> 01:10:34,860
And still, now,
nothing has been done.

747
01:10:34,860 --> 01:10:36,860
No-one's been brought to justice.

748
01:10:36,860 --> 01:10:39,020
And everybody just looks
the other way.

749
01:11:05,420 --> 01:11:09,220
This is a whole industry gone rogue

750
01:11:09,220 --> 01:11:13,420
in a deadly alliance with the worst
dictators of this world,

751
01:11:13,420 --> 01:11:16,260
making human rights
work impossible.

752
01:11:16,260 --> 01:11:19,460
And, Mr Commissioner, you had many
nice words and strategies.

753
01:11:19,460 --> 01:11:21,740
First of all, it's about
enforcement.

754
01:11:21,740 --> 01:11:24,860
Second of all, this whole thing has
a foreign policy and human rights

755
01:11:24,860 --> 01:11:27,340
dimension you haven't even
spoken about.

756
01:11:29,100 --> 01:11:32,780
We need a global ban on the export
of these kinds of spyware.

757
01:11:32,780 --> 01:11:36,260
And we need to ask the tough
questions to other governments,

758
01:11:36,260 --> 01:11:38,460
including those in Israel
and Saudi Arabia.

759
01:13:36,580 --> 01:13:38,140
Thank you.

760
01:16:00,300 --> 01:16:03,980
REPORTER: A US appeals court is
allowing WhatsApp messaging service

761
01:16:03,980 --> 01:16:06,980
to move forward with a lawsuit
against NSO Group

762
01:16:06,980 --> 01:16:11,020
over allegedly targeting some
of its servers in California

763
01:16:11,020 --> 01:16:14,660
to infect about 1,400 mobile devices
with malware,

764
01:16:14,660 --> 01:16:17,260
a violation of state
and federal law.

765
01:16:18,380 --> 01:16:22,180
All we've seen NSO Group is,
deny, deny, deny,

766
01:16:22,180 --> 01:16:25,340
and that's shown up entirely
through the legal process as well.

767
01:16:25,340 --> 01:16:27,780
There's an argument, and, at times,
a lot of companies,

768
01:16:27,780 --> 01:16:30,020
they fix a security vulnerability
and they move on

769
01:16:30,020 --> 01:16:32,020
because they don't want to
draw attention

770
01:16:32,020 --> 01:16:35,220
to what could be a negative story
about their product.

771
01:16:35,220 --> 01:16:40,300
But over the last three years,
more companies invest more resources

772
01:16:40,300 --> 01:16:43,340
in finding and fixing
vulnerabilities,

773
01:16:43,340 --> 01:16:46,580
take action against NSO Group,
such as through lawsuits,

774
01:16:46,580 --> 01:16:49,100
where we had a number of
technology companies,

775
01:16:49,100 --> 01:16:53,060
in addition to civil society,
join our lawsuit with amicus briefs

776
01:16:53,060 --> 01:16:55,340
in support of our position,
which is very helpful.

777
01:16:56,980 --> 01:16:58,740
The way I think about it

778
01:16:58,740 --> 01:17:02,860
is tech companies can and should do
everything they can

779
01:17:02,860 --> 01:17:05,740
to make their software
as secure as possible,

780
01:17:05,740 --> 01:17:09,380
but at the end of the day,
if there's no consequences

781
01:17:09,380 --> 01:17:11,660
for people who try
to break that software

782
01:17:11,660 --> 01:17:13,340
to commit human rights abuses,

783
01:17:13,340 --> 01:17:15,660
then there will always be people
trying to do it.

784
01:17:22,420 --> 01:17:28,140
In Europe, the NSO scandal
bounced back in December 2021

785
01:17:28,140 --> 01:17:31,500
because we were discovering
new victims of the spyware

786
01:17:31,500 --> 01:17:34,620
and because new countries
were accused of using Pegasus

787
01:17:34,620 --> 01:17:36,300
to spy on their opponents.

788
01:17:37,660 --> 01:17:40,820
REPORTER: Pegasus spyware is once
again back in the spotlight,

789
01:17:40,820 --> 01:17:43,660
this time for targeting
pro-independence supporters

790
01:17:43,660 --> 01:17:44,900
in Spain's Catalonia.

791
01:17:47,300 --> 01:17:50,780
In Spain, more than 60 victims
of Pegasus were identified,

792
01:17:50,780 --> 01:17:53,660
including the Prime Minister,
Pedro Sanchez,

793
01:17:53,660 --> 01:17:56,100
and Catalan European MPs,

794
01:17:56,100 --> 01:18:00,180
and, in Poland, Pegasus was
suspected of being used

795
01:18:00,180 --> 01:18:01,780
by the ruling party

796
01:18:01,780 --> 01:18:06,300
to spy on its political opponents
during the 2019 election campaign.

797
01:18:08,860 --> 01:18:11,220
REPORTER: Several members
of Poland's opposition

798
01:18:11,220 --> 01:18:15,300
have produced evidence they were
hacked by Pegasus Software.

799
01:18:15,300 --> 01:18:19,420
REPORTER: This scandal is being
dubbed the Polish Watergate.

800
01:19:16,020 --> 01:19:17,780
Thank you, Mr Chairman.

801
01:19:17,780 --> 01:19:20,380
On behalf of NSO,
I want to thank the members

802
01:19:20,380 --> 01:19:23,620
of the committee of inquiry
for having us here today.

803
01:19:23,620 --> 01:19:26,220
Before we begin, we should note
that there are limits

804
01:19:26,220 --> 01:19:29,180
to the information we can share
with the committee and others.

805
01:19:29,180 --> 01:19:31,260
As you know,
NSO is a private company

806
01:19:31,260 --> 01:19:34,900
providing expert controlled
cyber intelligence technologies

807
01:19:34,900 --> 01:19:37,340
only in exclusive
to government agencies

808
01:19:37,340 --> 01:19:39,940
for the purpose of preventing
and investigating terrorism

809
01:19:39,940 --> 01:19:41,780
and other serious crimes.

810
01:19:41,780 --> 01:19:45,620
As a result, we are unable to share
details about our customers

811
01:19:45,620 --> 01:19:48,300
as well as the crimes prevented
and criminals tracked

812
01:19:48,300 --> 01:19:50,140
and apprehended using
our technologies

813
01:19:50,140 --> 01:19:51,900
or trade secrets of the technology.

814
01:19:51,900 --> 01:19:54,980
I would like now to dispel a number
of misconceptions

815
01:19:54,980 --> 01:19:57,660
that have surfaced
in press and public debate

816
01:19:57,660 --> 01:20:01,020
with respect to our company's
activities and technologies.

817
01:20:01,020 --> 01:20:03,980
It is not true that NSO Group
operates Pegasus

818
01:20:03,980 --> 01:20:06,420
and collects information
about individuals.

819
01:20:06,420 --> 01:20:11,660
It is not true that NSO Group sells
its technology to private companies.

820
01:20:11,660 --> 01:20:15,860
The issues that came up
about Jamal Khashoggi,

821
01:20:15,860 --> 01:20:18,940
about President Macron -

822
01:20:18,940 --> 01:20:21,180
the system was not used
on those numbers.

823
01:20:21,180 --> 01:20:24,980
I will go immediately into the Q&A
session of today's meeting.

824
01:20:24,980 --> 01:20:28,820
We already have about 15 members
who've asked for the floor.

825
01:20:28,820 --> 01:20:32,140
Have United Arab Emirates
and Saudi Arabia

826
01:20:32,140 --> 01:20:37,260
ever gone through your due diligence
check, and have they passed it?

827
01:20:38,660 --> 01:20:41,820
As I said, I'm not going to respond
to questions

828
01:20:41,820 --> 01:20:44,740
regarding specific
potential customers.

829
01:20:44,740 --> 01:20:48,940
Given that UAE and Saudi Arabia
have been using Pegasus software,

830
01:20:48,940 --> 01:20:52,500
who are legitimate actors to issue
warrants in these countries

831
01:20:52,500 --> 01:20:54,980
according to your checks?

832
01:20:54,980 --> 01:20:56,660
Again, I repeat it again,

833
01:20:56,660 --> 01:20:58,340
I'm not going to respond
to questions

834
01:20:58,340 --> 01:20:59,940
regarding specific customers.

835
01:21:09,340 --> 01:21:11,580
I cannot - and, again, I repeat,

836
01:21:11,580 --> 01:21:15,260
I cannot, because of various
confidentiality and secrecy issues,

837
01:21:15,260 --> 01:21:17,020
I cannot get into specific questions

838
01:21:17,020 --> 01:21:19,220
regarding specific customers
or specific cases.

839
01:21:43,900 --> 01:21:46,580
First of all, every customer
that we sell to

840
01:21:46,580 --> 01:21:51,540
goes through the due diligence
review in advance,

841
01:21:51,540 --> 01:21:55,500
and if...and very often
if concerns are raised

842
01:21:55,500 --> 01:21:57,020
regarding the rule of law,

843
01:21:57,020 --> 01:21:59,380
because what we're looking at
is also a rule of law,

844
01:21:59,380 --> 01:22:03,340
and any country that we've
decided to sell to

845
01:22:03,340 --> 01:22:05,220
has been approved in this manner.

846
01:22:05,220 --> 01:22:07,300
Please, stop -
stop the storytelling.

847
01:22:07,300 --> 01:22:09,380
I'm going to continue in Hungarian.

848
01:22:25,700 --> 01:22:27,140
Good question.

849
01:22:29,660 --> 01:22:31,940
Again, I said...

850
01:22:31,940 --> 01:22:34,420
Not again, it was a new question.

851
01:22:34,420 --> 01:22:35,740
So, please.

852
01:22:37,060 --> 01:22:41,260
I have not said... We have not said
that we have determined recently

853
01:22:41,260 --> 01:22:43,860
that Hungary is or is not
a secure country.

854
01:22:43,860 --> 01:22:45,420
You did consider it secure,

855
01:22:45,420 --> 01:22:47,100
because you sold the stuff to them.

856
01:22:47,100 --> 01:22:48,380
Excuse me... I said now...

857
01:22:48,380 --> 01:22:50,820
Let's keep a little bit of order
in the meeting as well.

858
01:22:50,820 --> 01:22:54,140
I understand there is frustration,
but it doesn't help us

859
01:22:54,140 --> 01:22:58,500
if we all start posing
questions in a chaotic fashion.

860
01:22:58,500 --> 01:23:00,580
So, you have the concrete question.

861
01:23:00,580 --> 01:23:02,140
We have a concrete answer.

862
01:23:02,140 --> 01:23:04,980
And, please. Can you, as the chair,

863
01:23:04,980 --> 01:23:07,220
can you ask Mr Gelfand to either say

864
01:23:07,220 --> 01:23:09,900
that he is refusing
to answer the questions,

865
01:23:09,900 --> 01:23:13,740
or answer the questions? Because you
keep repeating the same thing,

866
01:23:13,740 --> 01:23:16,580
and there seems to be a complete
disconnect between reality

867
01:23:16,580 --> 01:23:18,060
and between what you're saying.

868
01:23:18,060 --> 01:23:21,260
This is like... You know, it's an
insult to our intelligence. Sorry.

869
01:24:18,340 --> 01:24:22,260
In some ways, we can talk
about the impact on the company

870
01:24:22,260 --> 01:24:25,180
and say it's been really profound.

871
01:24:25,180 --> 01:24:29,260
A more pessimistic view would be to
look at the entire industry,

872
01:24:29,260 --> 01:24:35,100
which remains unreformed,
pretty wild, unregulated.

873
01:24:36,380 --> 01:24:39,220
NSO may vanish,

874
01:24:39,220 --> 01:24:45,380
but I feel no more secure
talking in front of my phone now

875
01:24:45,380 --> 01:24:47,860
than I did when we first published.

876
01:24:49,540 --> 01:24:51,580
I don't think these issues
have gone away.